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ABSTRACT
Institutional owners of real estate are paying increasingly more attention to property
management as a means of improving their return on investment. They are closely
examining both the organization of their property management effort and its
implementation. In many cases they are devising radically new structures to manage
property involving a combination of in house resources and external providers. Most
owners appear to want property managers to bring new levels of professionalism to their
day to day operations.
Owners see value in sweeping reorganization of their property management activities to
capture economies of scale and reduced fees. Some accord property management a
strategic status and have created in-house property management capability. Some owners
are seeking to add to the value of property management by broad application of the
principles of service quality enhancement. These owners put mechanisms in place to
empower their frontline property managers. Others exhibit the desire to improve property
management performance through relatively tight control and standardization. Still other
owners appear to believe that active management of property managers is best left to the
property management firms themselves.
This thesis describes property management strategies at three large insurance companies
using an analytic framework taken from literature on vertical integration and quality
management. The data was analyzed to identify how the insurance companies, and
institutional owners of real estate generally, are organizing and implementing their property
management function, and what rationales they have for their strategies.
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CHAPTER ONE - Institutions and Property Management - Structure of the Study
Introduction
Real estate is an integral component of most investment portfolios held by large financial
institutions. Despite the comparatively poor performance of real estate vis a vis other
investments in the past few years, there is widespread belief that the diversification benefits
of having real estate in a broad based portfolio will still be evident over time. While some
institutions have recently reduced their allocation, my research indicates that many will
continue to hold about 10% of their assets in real estate when their portfolios are stabilized.
Along with this show of faith, however, have come much more rigorous expectations for the
management of real estate investments. Investment advisors have identified effective
property management as one critical component of maximizing the value of real estate
holdings.
Many different kinds of owner/clients retain property management services. This study
focuses on the needs of large financial institutions such as insurance companies, pension
funds, and mutual funds. In many cases these entities are new to the challenges of property
management, having been reluctantly transformed from lenders into owners in the fallout of
the recent real estate recession These companies are actively interested in the question of
how to structure their property management effort effectively not only because it makes
good financial sense, but also because they are new to the game. Many of the firms, whose
portfolios were swollen in the early part of this decade with foreclosed properties, found
themselves in business relationships with many more provider firms than they could easily
manage. They seek a sound property management strategy that is also easy to administer.
A later section details some of the prevailing business conditions that focus attention on
property management practices. Many institutional owners, as a result of examining their
practices more closely, are confronting a fundamental dilemma: should they have an
internal property management capability or hire the service from outside providers? Once
they settle on whether or not to maintain in-house property management, they ask further,
"what kind of organization for this work should be developed?", and "how should the
property management plan be implemented?"
The purpose of this study is to explore some of the organizational strategies employed by
large institutional owners of real estate for maximizing investment value from the property
management effort. Generally speaking, the owners may create a property management
division or subsidiary, hire out the work on a regional basis to national providers, or adopt
an intensely local strategy, seeking out the best providers at work in each place where they
have an investment. The strategies are rarely "pure" in the sense that owner involvement is
entirely absent from out-tasking strategies, or that in-house management systems are not in
some way supplemented with outside providers. The study will examine the various
reasons real estate owners and advisors may have for selecting one form of property
management over another. The study also looks at different ways owners are searching for
value beyond cost savings from the property manager's effort.
Section 1 - Commercial Property Constituencies
One can think of commercial property as having two sets of customers - tenants and
investors. In this paradigm the property manager is the entity that the tenant/customer sees
as most accountable for its satisfaction. With respect to the investor, the property manager
is the principal generator of information about the performance of the asset. Although the
investor's primary dealings are with the portfolio manager, it is the data from the property
managers upon which the portfolio manager must rely, both for its investment decision
making and for providing aggregated performance reports to investors.
Many commercial real estate portfolios are structured with three layers of management -
portfolio management, asset management, and property management. As noted, the
portfolio manager's allegiance is to the owner/investor. The portfolio manager's
responsibility is to extract adequate returns from a mix of investments, buying and selling
properties to maintain the presumed optimal asset allocation. The asset manager's role is to
champion the performance of a specific asset or assets as long as they have a place within
the established portfolio strategy. The asset manager develops a business plan for each
property in its purview, and directs the property manager in its execution of the plan. The
property manager must operate the building efficiently and be responsive to the tenants
needs while carrying out a strategy developed by, and receiving its compensation from, the
asset manager. If the asset manager's plans for the property and the tenants needs are not
in accord, as might be the case in the months preceding a sale, the property manager can
find itself in a difficult position.
One can see how all the three "constituencies" - the owner, the asset, and the
tenant/customers - are well served if the efforts of the three management layers, though
sometimes in opposition to each other, are in rough equilibrium. If a good balance exists,
tenants are happy, occupancy is high, revenues strong, expenses low, the asset's
performance dependably good, and the portfolio's returns will exceed targets. This is a
good construct to keep in mind when issues such as incentive alignments and conflict of
interest surface in examining property management strategies.
Section 2 - the Business Context
An inevitable consequence of events of the past decade, in which many real estate
investments not only failed to keep pace with stocks and bonds but actually lost value, is that
investors want to see measurable performance improvements in the near term. Although the
cyclic behavior of real estate investments is anticipated and accepted by most investors,
consistent underperformance is not. Years such as 1990, when stocks were down and real
estate failed to perform as an effective hedge, were particularly frustrating to investors in real
property. Real estate investment management activities are thus subjected not only to
increased scrutiny, but also to demands that demonstrable performance improvements be
made very quickly.
Until quite recently, real estate professionals paid comparatively little attention to property
management. They regarded it primarily as a custodial function, visible only when things
went wrong. Buildings were to be kept clean, parking lots plowed, rent collected. That
property management enjoys elevated stature today is a function of the increasingly tight
margins real estate investors have to work with. No cost driver can be glossed over in the
asset manager's strategy. The impetus to extract value from property management is clearly
motivated by the bottom line, but it has many distinct components.
Property Management As A Source Of Value To Investors
In the current business environment, fundamental changes have taken place in the way real
estate investment managers are compensated for their work. Most significantly, investors
evaluate portfolio and asset management fees against those they would pay to have their
money placed in stocks and bonds. Real estate is a management intensive investment and,
until recently, high management fees were justifiable. The work is still there, but if the
investment returns on real estate cannot exceed those on other forms of investment, then it is
no surprise that intense downward pressure on fees exists. Where once portfolio
management fees were exclusively volume and transaction based, it is now not uncommon
to hear of plans aligning some part of management compensation with the performance of
the portfolio. To the extent that this kind of incentive alignment is applicable at the portfolio
management level it can readily be seen that cost effective property management must be a
first order concern. If portfolio managers have truly strong incentives to enhance the
performance of their holdings, they will be vigilant for every opportunity to build asset value
by directing their property managers in strategies such as reducing operating costs,
repositioning their buildings in changing markets, and optimizing leasing structures.
Moreover, it seems likely that this state of affairs is not cyclic. Intense competition and the
distinct improbability of real estate ever again being viewed as a fail-safe investment will
ensure that highly effective property management will be of paramount concern for the
foreseeable future.
Property Management as a Source of Value to Real Estate Service Providers
Due in large part to the wave of foreclosures in the late eighties and early nineties, a much
greater percentage of commercial real estate is now in the hands of institutional owners than
ever before. Having provided more stock than can be absorbed in the near term, developers
are out of business or curtailing their activity. While many of the institutions have pursued
strategies calling for partial divestment of their real estate in the early nineties, the volume of
buying and selling is much smaller than it was in the mid eighties. At present, many
institutions have comparatively little money allocated in their budgets for real estate
acquisitions. Beyond tactical selling to meet portfolio allocation targets, the well capitalized
institutions have little incentive to sell real estate, particularly at prices which are still
commonly below replacement cost. Those that wish to sell often find little demand and a
scarcity of acceptable assets to buy to maintain their allocation. The institutions are waiting
for demand for space to rebound. Foreign investment, though reviving in some markets, is
still far from levels of a decade ago.
The institutions have thus become holders of real estate of last resort. Business expansion
into new space, with the exception of certain industries like financial services, has been
tentative in the past few years. Transaction activity, both from leasing and sales, is down,
and with it, an important source of income to many players in the real estate industry. In
this climate, the revenue potential of property management services gets intensified attention.
Property managers, not surprisingly, are fashioning arguments for why their fees should be
higher. They cite the value their efforts can add, and how it is multiplied by the effect of
capitalization rates in valuation models. One manager used the following simple illustration:
If he could improve annual bottom line performance of a property by one million dollars, he
would have increased the value of that property by ten million, at a 10% cap rate. He
contended that, at fees of 2 to 3% on revenues collected, he would have meager incentive to
aggressively pursue the necessary actions to net the higher net income. He argued that
bonus incentives in the $100,000 to $500,000 range were more likely to produce results
than a $20,000 to $30,000 fee enhancement. (Sheridan, 1995)
Supply Forces
A logical consequence of the growing interest in property management is a dramatic
increase in firms providing property management services. Real estate firms, primarily the
development and some of the brokerage companies, whose specialties are not now in
demand, have repositioned themselves. They offer an enlarged menu of services, often
including property management.
Some people interviewed for this study claim that the nature of the service offered is
influenced by the core capability of the provider firm. They argue, for example, that the
cultures of development and brokerage firms are distinct enough to be reflected in the way
each kind of company approaches property management. Brokerage firms, so the theory
goes, would manage in a way that consistently defers to the deal. Developer-managers, with
long experience as operators of their own properties, would emphasize the orderly long term
management of the asset over an attractive tenant's demanding lease terms. Managers who
have contributed to creating value through the development process would provide a great
deal of entrepreneurial motivation with regard to property management. This kind of
thinking suggests that along with the growing number of providers comes a broader array
of management styles to choose from.
But restraints on supply are also evident in today's market. Anecdotal evidence suggests
that significant consolidation has begun to place in the real estate services industry. Strong
local providers are being purchased by regional and national firms; major national and
regional players are merging.
Changes In Ownership Of Commercial Real Estate
Institutions bring their own corporate culture, organizational structures, and policies to the
ownership of real estate. Where owner-developers are most often comparatively small
companies with lean organizational structures, institutional owners, such as the major life
companies and pension funds which are the subject of this study, may be large,
multidimensional businesses. The owner-developers structure themselves to act quickly; the
institutions, with their fiduciary responsibilities always in the forefront, to act with great
accountability. The effect of these structural differences on property management is that the
institutions demand more service, typically manifested in detailed and varied reporting
requirements and heavily scrutinized budget processes, than owner-developers have
typically been willing to settle for.
Both because they have heightened interest in property management as a source of value,
and because of their fiduciary role, advisors to institutions are demanding ever increasing
professionalization of the property management function. When large institutions own real
estate the stakeholders are many, diverse, and geographically dispersed. Accountability is
multivalent - the beneficiaries, investment committees, accountants, boards of directors, as
well as the asset and portfolio managers - need to know how their investment is performing.
The internal reporting requirements are infinitely more complex than they are for a local
developer, and they depend completely on accurate, timely, and usefully presented
information from the property manager.
Institutions are not simply content to demand greater competence from their service
providers; they wish to exert more direct control themselves. At one time property
managers negotiated and signed leases at their own discretion, as long as they operated
within the owner's set parameters. Today it is increasingly common for institutional owners,
or their advisors, to insist on reviewing and approving each lease, and sometimes on
participating in the negotiations.
Institutional ownership of real estate promises to increase opportunities for the property
managers who can perform to exacting standards. This "good news" scenario is tempered
somewhat by the possible consequences of the growing importance of public ownership of
real estate. Conventional wisdom holds that the most successful REITs will be those that
structure themselves as full service real estate operating companies. To the extent that this
model becomes prevalent, there will be fewer opportunities for fee for service managers.
Presently, publicly owned real estate is a small fraction of all commercial real estate, but if
that fraction grows as anticipated, the supply and demand dynamics of property
management will likely change.
Public ownership of commercial real estate again brings up the comparison between real
estate and stocks and bonds as investment vehicles. Real estate requires hands-on treatment
at every phase in the investment cycle - acquisition, operation, and disposition. In this way
real estate compares distinctly unfavorably with assets like stocks and bonds that need little
tending by their portfolio managers. Public market scrutiny is thus certain to put
considerable pressure on the management structures of REITs to be lean and efficient.
Institution owned investment real estate, even if it is in the private realm, cannot buck this
trend for long and remain competitive. Property managers for institutions will have to do
their part to contribute to the productivity of the total management effort.
Section 3 - Strategies For Property Management
The real estate portfolios of the major institutions are typically large and diversified by
region and property type. Broad expertise is required to manage the properties in these
portfolios. This section briefly describes the currently dominant property management
models in the market today, and why owners may or may not elect to choose each one.
Chapter 2 of this study presents a review of current literature on subjects which pertain to
the fundamental choice institutions must make between managing their property themselves
or having others do it. If owners make the decision to have a separate entity do the work,
they then must choose what kind of provider they want. They have a full spectrum of
options to choose from, ranging from full service national firms to local specialists. It is not
uncommon for owners today to have property managers of all descriptions managing
portions of their portfolios.
Property Management By an In-House Entity or Subsidiary
Certain institutions may find it advantageous to have their own property management
capability. With this strategy, the benefits of simplified reporting, standardization, and,
depending on the size of the institution, economies of scale can be realized. Having an in-
house capability may yield more reliable service over the long term than continuously
purchasing the service. Benchmarking can be undertaken, and the results used to structure
internal incentive programs in the absence of competitive pressure to retain the assignment.
However, if the investor has only a few properties in a given area it may be impractical to set
up a property management function there; already existing regional players could take on
the work more efficiently. Market specific knowledge would take time to acquire. Without
competition innovative property management techniques might go undiscovered.
Property Management By External. Locally Strong Firms
In this model, portfolio managers select property management firms with strong reputations
in the markets in which the investment properties are located. Theoretically, these firms
would be best able to identify and retain the most appropriate local services, to understand
competitive forces within the market, and to be familiar with existing and prospective
tenants. As each firm would contribute a body of knowledge about property management
strategies and techniques there would be rich opportunities to exchange information about
best practices.
Such firms are unlikely, however, to be immediately conversant with the corporate practices
and information systems of the institution that hires them. The portfolio and asset
managers face a shake-out period with each new property manager hired, and the prospect
of managing multiple entities under dissimilar contractual agreements. Some of the firms
with the best local reputations may be purely local firms, without the technical resources and
management sophistication of larger firms. With this kind of atomistic approach to
property management it may be difficult to make meaningful comparisons between the
quality of service provided by the provider firms.
Property Management By External National or Regional Firms On A Regional Basis
In this model national fee management firms would be retained on at least a regional basis
to operate the buildings in the portfolio. Portfolio managers may find this model attractive
because it promises standardized operating and reporting procedures over many properties.
The property management firms may be able to win pricing concessions from
subcontractors and vendors due to economies of scale. Benchmarking can be readily used
to set conditions for the renewal of the engagement.
Clients of national and regional fee management firms often complain that their full
potential is rarely realized. Despite standardized practices some of the firm's offices are
inevitably stronger than others. The inconsistencies are often attributable to differences in
the quality of personnel, which can result in local market reputations being strong in some
places, weak in others.
Property Management By External Networked Providers
"Federated" associations of property managers exist in which strong local and regional
firms band together under a loose administrative structure which facilitates information
sharing. The network of provider firms offers sole source responsibility by allowing the
client firm to choose a "quarterback" from among them. This is usually a firm with whom
the client has a prior relationship and which has demonstrated superior capability in the
particular services the client wants. The quarterback firm may select provider firms for the
client in the other markets in which the client owns property. The quarterback firm is not
obliged to choose all these firms only from the network members, but rather will seek out
firms with the particular strengths the client has specified. In theory, the integrity and
credibility of the network concept is upheld if clients perceive the quarterback firm taking its
charge seriously enough to breach the network in selecting some members of its team.
The promoted advantage of the network system is that clients can enjoy single point
responsibility without giving up strong local representation. Such an arrangement does not,
however, offer the same economies of scale and standardization that single large firms do.
The networked providers counter that remaining fairly autonomous allows them to be
nimble and pro-active in their respective markets, an advantage which they regard as more
valuable.
Section 4 - Property Management - the Emerging Picture
Today, institutional owners view property management as a vitally important function and
not a commodity service. Many owners see value in a systematic review of how property
management is delivered, and are willing to undertake significant reorganization of this
work. Attempts to capture significant near term cost savings are behind some aspects of the
contemplated reorganizations. Institutions are trying to simplify property management and
achieve economies of scale by either vertically integrating or doing business with regional
and national providers. Smaller, local property management firms may be left out in the
cold.
Still other owners, perhaps with an initial reorganization effort behind them, are now
devoting their attention to developing and putting in place property management procedures
that will add value over time. More and more owners will address these aspects of property
management service as time goes by. They will develop organizational strategies to facilitate
continuous improvement in the property management function. No matter where they are in
this continuum from cost reduction to quality enhancement, most owners are in agreement
that they must, in one way or another, actively manage their property managers to extract
maximum value from them.
The research and analysis in the remainder of this study first refines then tests these views.
To determine whether the views can be substantiated, I will concentrate much of the research
in this study on the owners of real estate, and their perception of how value is created
through property management.
This picture of current developments in property management has two dimensions -
organization and implementation. Consideration of how the property management entity is
organized necessarily addresses the questions of how integrated the manager is with the
client company, how the manger is selected, what services it is asked to perform, and what
trade-offs are implicit in these choices. To examine how a property manager implements its
duties one must address each of the major functions the property manger performs -
operating the building; providing accounting, reporting, and budgeting services; and dealing
with tenants.
Section 5 - The Study Methodology
As stated earlier, the purpose of this study is to describe strategies of property management
in use by institutions today, to suggest reasons why each strategy makes sense, and to
illustrate some of the ways the various strategies are implemented. The study does not
aspire to determine which strategy is best. Limitations of time and other resources preclude
such an analysis. Even if the resources were present, the difficulty of measuring the cost
and benefits of each property management strategy and assembling reliable data would be a
formidable obstacle to overcome.
I discuss leasing in the context of the client firms' attitude about whether it makes more
sense to combine responsibility for operations and leasing or leave them separate. This
study does not cover, except in a tangential way, the implementation (marketing,
negotiations, etc.) of a leasing program.
The Research
In the course of this study I have performed three kinds of research:
Literature Review: While property management receives some attention in the trade press,
I found it useful to review general management literature as well. Theories on vertical
integration, outsourcing, customer satisfaction, customer retention, service quality, and
strategic alliances, and the use of information technology are all applicable to this work.
Background Questionnaires: Data on current property management practices is, of
course, absolutely essential to the study. To obtain a fairly broad impression of
contemporary practices, I circulated a questionnaire (Appendix) to several client and service
provider firms. From 22 questionnaires distributed I received 11 replies. Client firms
among the respondents included national insurance companies, pension fund advisors, and
mutual fund companies. Provider firms among the respondents included national and
regional and local (a network member) companies.
In Depth On Site Interviews and Document Reviews: I obtained the cooperation of three
major institutional holders of commercial real estate for in depth profiles of their property
management practices. In each case, I made site visits; conducted numerous interviews with
regional directors and asset managers; and examined documentation such as property
management procedures manuals, standard contracts, property manager performance
evaluations, and internal reports on various initiatives to improve the property management
effort. In performing the on site research I ascertained, to the extent possible, the degree to
which each firm felt that its property management program in general, and its specific
components, were meeting its expectations.
To protect the anonymity of my sources I have presented the data obtained from the on site
interviews and the questionnaires without attribution or using pseudonyms.
The Analysis
The first and third sections of Chapter 2 present a discussion of vertical integration and
quality enhancement based on a review of pertinent management literature. The literature
includes commentary pertaining to manufacturing and service businesses in fields other
than real estate, and, within the real estate industry, to sectors other than institution owned.
It is about performance optimization strategies for both selecting an organization and
enhancing the value of its operations. The synthesis of this material, therefore, is a picture
of the kind of thinking that might go into structuring any kind of business process which
would have the best prospects of creating value.
The second and fourth sections of Chapter 2 more explicitly tie the literature review to a
consideration of property management for institutions. Section two presents an analytic
framework, using concepts distilled from the discussion on vertical integration, for
examining the decisions institutions make about organizing their property management
effort. Section four identifies the principal components of a quality enhancement program
and illustrates how they might be applied to property management operations. Through
these two conceptual frameworks - one for examining the initial organization of the property
management activity and one for examining what implementation strategies firms adopt to
enhance the value of the property management effort - I hope to present views of
contemporary property management practice. Through this analysis I will try to
substantiate the thesis that institutional owners of real estate recognize that they must
actively manage the property management effort, that they believe that in many instances
they can realize dramatic cost reductions by fundamental organizational change, and that
they are beginning to look now to the way their properties are managed on a day to day
basis for a more sustainable way of creating value.
The three company profiles are presented in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 4, I examine the three profiles through the analytic frameworks developed in
Chapter 2. Since the three profiles are being reviewed against the same frameworks the
analysis will permit the reader to readily perceive both major differences and minor
variations in emphasis among them. I then analyze the data from the profiles to see if the
arguments about property management made in the introduction to this chapter are
sustainable.
CHAPTER TWO - The Analytic Framework
Section 1 - Vertical Integration - Literature Review
One fundamental choice the institutional owners of real estate have to make with respect to
property management is whether to build the capability within the organization or to contract
for it from outside providers. This choice is felt by many to have potentially profound
influence over both the cost and the quality of the service provided.
Vertical integration is the term used by business theorists to refer to the strategy of
combining complementary yet distinct functional activities under one management umbrella.
Vertical integration, and its opposite number, outsourcing, are subjects covered extensively
in the general business literature. Much of the literature is about manufacturing processes
and service industries other than real estate. Nonetheless, a review of this work yields a
valuable framework for thinking about whether or not to integrate property management into
the general management structure for investment real estate. When the choice is made to
hire an outside provider, the arguments for and against having an in house capability are still
useful to consider while the decision is made about what kind of outside provider to select.
Financial institutions have a fiduciary duty to their clients: their policyholders, shareholders,
beneficiaries and depositors. Some proponents of vertical integration in industry hold that
the best way to discharge this duty is to exert maximum control over all phases of the
business. They identify accountability as the most important reason for adopting this
policy. A truly accountable business is one which offers its services in a reliable and timely
way, and offers swift and satisfactory recourse when things go wrong. Customers of
businesses whose performance exceeds the market average in these respects perceive them
as highly accountable. As a bonus of sorts, a firm that can fulfill, and perhaps even exceed,
the level of good management required of a fiduciary is felt to have a source of advantage
with respect to its competitors (Ackerberg, 1989). Only vertically integrated businesses can
be fully accountable.
Even the staunchest proponents of vertical integration concede that economies of scale are
necessary to justify the expense of maintaining full service capability across many markets.
This simple argument is rooted in economic and accounting logic. The vertically integrated
function is a fixed cost to the company, whereas fee based services can be contracted for on
an as needed basis, and easily scaled to the task at hand.
The decision not to carry an in house capability is usually based first on cost considerations
(Martinsons, 1993). The company cannot achieve economies of scale everywhere it
operates and opts to subcontract some of its processes or services. This course is very
appealing to company policy makers who can anticipate expense reductions in a wide array
of company activities as a consequence. Costs can be reduced or avoided in recruitment,
supervision, benefits, equipment obsolescence, payroll, purchasing, and hiring temps. While
the cost of these activities, and of the space required to perform them, will be embedded in
the outside service provider's fee, the client company pays only on an incremental basis
(Friedman, 1991). This is a particularly salient point with respect to cyclical businesses
subject to unpredictable cycles where the function in question may be needed at some times
and not at others.
What if the business enjoys critical mass at every location? Are there still compelling
arguments for contracting out certain functions when it appears that the client firm can
plausibly run them efficiently? Advocates of hiring out the services in question cite
specialization as one reason. Specialization, when, for example, it takes the form of local
market knowledge, may be demonstrably more important than economies of scale. The
make vs. buy analysis thus changes from a consideration of how the client firm's resources
can be most efficiently utilized, to examining the particular value enhancement the provider
firm claims to offer. Typically, the provider firm will assert that because it specializes in a
certain function, its labor resources will be more skilled and thus more efficient in that
activity. The provider film may also claim scale efficiencies of its own. It will make the
argument that because it operates in many markets for many clients it can obtain supplies
and services at lower costs from its vendors (Lacity, 1993). Outside providers may simply
have a fundamentally lower cost structure - lower wages and overhead, or stronger
performance incentives. (Venkatesan, 1992)
Provider arguments such as these are persuasive, but large client firms clearly have the
potential to exercise their own purchasing power and to develop specialists within their own
ranks. They may put in place broadscope purchasing programs for the kinds of capital
equipment that are standard at many of their locations. They may train or hire their own
specialists. Repeatedly going to the market for services is itself a time consuming and
costly process. In time, the in house specialists may be even more valuable than those
employed on a fee basis. The in house specialists will grow within the company, becoming
familiar with its culture and service philosophy. They will always be available. The threat
of an external provider's highly competent and valued employee being promoted away from
direct client service to a management or marketing role within her own organization is very
real.
For many theorists, the decision about whether or not to carry a function in house is
grounded not just in near term cost analysis but also in tactical considerations. Any
business operating in a competitive environment will have a strategy to establish and sustain
an advantage over its competitors. The theorists contend that firms should themselves
provide the services that they are good at and that have strategic significance. In the
language of manufacturing, they should keep the proprietary parts, those that confer a
competitive advantage, in house, and buy from others the components that are easily
commodified. These firms will want to keep secret certain techniques and procedures.
They will be more than usually concerned that they not be exposed to conflicts of interest
which may lead to breaches of confidentiality.
How do firms decide what products or services are strategic? Might there be good reasons
to outsource even strategic goods and services? Venkatesan offers three test to use in
determining whether or not an activity is strategic:
1) Does it "have a high impact on what customers perceive as the most important product
attributes (including cost, of course)?"
2) Does it "require highly specialized design and manufacturing skills and specialized
physical assets - and for which there are very few, if any, capable independent suppliers?"
3) Does it involve "technology that is relatively fluid and in which there is a significant
likelihood of gaining a clear technological lead."
Venkatesan acknowledges that even strategic activities may be purchased outside the
company, but under strict conditions. The capabilities of the outside provider, both to
design and deliver the service, must be carefully weighed against the client firm's own
competencies and shown to be clearly superior. If the firm has no existing capability in a
certain function, then the costs that would be incurred to "catch up" with outside providers
must be assessed as significant. If a certain function is regarded as strategic, and if the firm,
based on the foregoing analysis, decides to engage an outside supplier anyway, then
Venkatesan counsels that it should generate at least the "architectural knowledge"
underpinning the function. It should supply performance specifications for the function to
its provider firm, in this way preserving its competitive position. In theory, this would
assure existing and would-be clients of the company that the aspects of its service they most
valued would consistently be delivered, whoever the provider firm was.
In its most evolved form contracting with an outside provider can take the form of a strategic
alliance. This implies a long term relationship where the partners integrate their strategic
efforts; freely share information on best practices, much of it learned from third parties;
jointly market their services; pool technology; and compensate their staffs based on meeting
mutually determined performance goals. The hallmarks of such an arrangement are
longevity and a good deal of functional integration. In a way, the strategic alliance is a
hybrid of the vertically integrated solution and hiring out, with what its advocates hope are
the best attributes of each.
The potential benefits of the strategic alliance are the efficiency that should come from
streamlining the working relationship over time, the knowledge sharing, and the joint
incentive that should exist to continually improve the alliance. A common criticism of
vertical integration, that the in house function cannot be fired and suffers motivation
shortfall as a result, is addressed with an alliance. Friedman notes that strategic partnering
"offers companies the opportunity to obtain stable pricing, eliminating the need to shop
around while worrying about distribution and consistency of quality. Once you zero in on
partners, educate them regarding your environment, and have them suggest ways to cut costs
at your end. That's where you save."
Contracting for important services, whether strategic or not, carries several perils. Recalling
an earlier part of this discussion, one can think of these generally as the risks of reduced
accountability. First and foremost, deciding not to have an in house capability means not
having it at any time in the business cycle. A current buyers' market for certain services
may not persist. The attractive cost structures of outside providers may melt away over
time. If contracts with the provider firms are short term, as is the rule, suppliers can raise
prices when they begin to feel truly needed. Without a viable in house capability, or a long
term relationship, the client firm will be vulnerable to a suddenly hostile market.
A major risk in a long term relationship with a service provider is that it will have some, but
not all, of the characteristics of a strategic alliance, and be mistaken as such by the client
firm. Outside providers are unlikely to be true strategic partners if, for example,
performance incentives are not scrupulously aligned. In this case, the loose contract
language which permits the strategic alliance its flexibility may be exploited as the provider
roots out sources of additional fee revenue.
Having enumerated the risks and disadvantages of relying on outside providers, the
literature (Lacity, 1993) does not neglect the matter of proper management of the
relationship once the decision has been made to use them anyway. Some commonly
encountered recommendations are:
- Have a formal grading system for suppliers to enable rigorous, informed comparison of
service quality.
- Allow the provider to fully exploit its economies of scale by bundling multiple
engagements together where possible
- Have a good contract, carefully specifying baseline performance, service levels, cost
structures, penalties for nonperformance. This often means discarding the supplier's
standard contract.
- Establish or retain in-house a core staff of specialists - engineers, lawyers, accountants
etc.- to set standards for and to assist the provider firms, and to advise the in-house
personnel on the quality of the provider firms' work and recommendations.
- Build in adjustment provisions if the business changes significantly - i.e. sale of assets,
or a major acquisition.
- Specify the account manager - choosing the right person can overcome omission of
many of the other items.
Specify termination clauses and the notification period required of both parties to
terminate.
Section 2 - Vertical Integration Theory and Property Management
The theory of vertical integration suggests that its value as a strategy depends on what
combination of business conditions exists at the time the decision to vertically integrate or
not is being made. The following is a synopsis of the conditions, with property
management specific illustrations.
Reasons to Vertically Integrate:
- Demonstrating accountability confers competitive advantage: Greater accountability at
all levels is a hallmark of institutional ownership. Property management's actions must
increasingly be both verifiable and justifiable. At least two major national real estate
advisory companies use only in house property management personnel (questionnaire
results). These companies believe that only with in house personnel at each property
can a high degree of accountability be assured. They actively market themselves as
differentiated from the competition by virtue of having in house property management.
The effectiveness of the property management strategy can be compromised if it has
imbedded within it potential conflicts of interest. Many firms which market property
management services also provide asset and portfolio management - they are themselves
vertically integrated. In cases where property managers in a common locale report both
to portfolio managers in their own company and to outside clients it would seem that the
latter group would have cause for concern. Coveted tenants, attractive repositioning
opportunities, favored subcontractors could gravitate towards the properties with the
fully integrated management structure. Despite the fact that the questionnaire circulated
to clients of property management firms did not list conflicts as one of the
considerations for choosing a manager, one respondent felt strongly enough about the
matter to pencil in "free of conflicts" as a necessary qualification.
When property managers are part of a full service real estate company, confidentiality
issues can arise. Accountability is blurred. One interviewee offered this illustration: A
fee manager may learn its institutional client's hurdle rate for new property purchases.
If the fee manager is part of a competing entity targeting properties in the same market,
its information may enable its colleagues in acquisitions to successfully underbid the
institution.
Many vertically integrated advisory firms have a temptation, perhaps even a strategic
mandate, to expand their fee base. When property management is carried out by their
own colleagues, portfolio managers could be tempted to call for marginally productive
property management services if, rather than having to pay for them, they represented
additional income.
- Property management is perceived as a strategic function: As noted in the first chapter
of this study, the institutions must be responsive to both investors and tenants. Property
management is very visible to tenants, completely invisible to investors; thus, application
of Venkatesan's first test (does the service have a high impact on what customer's
perceive as the most important product attributes?) to property management yields
ambiguous results. This condition is closely allied with the first. Firms who feel they
can sell in house property management as a source of competitive advantage are likely
also to think of it strategically. They are likely to engage in thinking of ways to
continuously improve this function, just as strategists do with all products that are not
viewed as simple commodities.
- Supply (and quality) of property management services vacillates: At present,
competition for property management engagements among qualified providers is
healthy, but as noted, a significant reduction in their number - largely due to the
disappearance of mid-size firms - is currently being observed. In house capability
guards against the time when there may not be enough fee managers active in a given
area to assure spirited bidding and top flight service execution.
- In-house providers are familiar with client expectations: Property managers and asset
managers can be neighbors in the same office suite. The modes of communication,
quality standards, culture and business strategies of the client could be ingrained in the
provider. Compatibility between the accounting and data systems of the hiring entity
and the provider is vital. This fact alone may justify carrying property management in-
house, engaging in a long term preferred provider relationship, or hiring national or
regional firms with capabilities in many accounting and data systems. Some smaller fee
managers may simply lack the capacity to fulfill all client's needs and will not even be
considered for the job. Some may be able to do it, but will judge that the anticipated
profit margin is too slim to be worth the trouble.
- Expectations are difficult to pin down in contract terms, particularly in dynamic markets:
Inevitably, some aspect of the scope of services the outside provider is meant to deliver
will be a point of controversy during the engagement. As noted earlier, the potential
ramifications of a lack of clarity in the terms are much more grave the longer the
contract length. In theory, an in-house provider can always be told what to do.
. There are inevitable "extra" costs to hiring a service provider. Service providers
typically include a profit in setting their fees. All things equal, the hiring firm would like
to keep this money in its own coffers. The process of identifying and retaining property
managers can be arduous and time consuming. There are substantial costs associated
with such a process, especially if it has a scrupulously followed sequence of steps which
could include an RFI, RFP, and multiple interviews. Selection processes can require
significant cash outlays from both the service provider and the client firm. The process,
particularly if it is elaborate, can have the unwanted effect of scaring off competent
property management candidates, who feel the engagement not worth the prospecting
costs. Winning firms willing to run the selection gauntlet may well price their service
with a compensating premium.
Reasons not to Vertically Integrate
. Critical mass / economies of scale are missing: At each site the vertically integrated
company has placed a staff there should be enough space to manage, tenants to respond
to, capital projects to oversee, etc. to warrant its existence. If there aren't, it may be
impossible to extract maximum productivity from the in-house property management
division. Having the in-house capability may not be justified when its return on
investment is calculated. Similarly, economies of scope are vital determinants in the
make vs. buy decision. Outside providers may be able to price themselves beneath an
in-house manager if there are enough synergies in the elements of the engagement (such
as a "package" of leasing, marketing and strategic repositioning duties) to enable them
to drive down costs. Out-tasking may even be desirable in the opposite circumstance, if
the owner keeps the menu of services so simple that it is easily commodified.
- Business cycles are pronounced and/or unpredictable: In portfolios when there is active
buying and selling both the scale and scope of the property management commissions
may change frequently and dramatically. Different capabilities are required for
properties that are on the sell list than for long term investments. Selling some of the
properties in a region may cause economies of scale to drop below threshold levels for
justifying the in-house function.
- Certain assets require specialized skills, knowledge and equipment: Operation and
leasing for retail and hotel properties are typically more demanding than for other forms
of commercial property. It would be commensurably more difficult to develop an in
house management capability for these property types. Owners often regard local
market knowledge possessed by an outside provider as a valuable form of
specialization. (Access to information through new technologies may permit national
property management firms to neutralize the historic advantage local firms have had in
knowledge of their particular market's idiosyncrasies. But these new technologies come
at a price, heavy investment in new capital and training, that may protect the local player's
cost advantage somewhat.) New, networked data management systems and customized
accounting packages promise to speed the aggregation of data from individual
properties into a form susceptible to analysis at the portfolio level. To the extent that
these systems permit flexibility as well as rapid response, portfolio mangers can also
offer investors report formats tailored to their individual specifications. This capability
is extraordinarily important to portfolio managers who need to respond to investor
demands for timely performance data.
An important issue in determining where to place the property management function is
whether or not the property management and leasing functions will be combined. The
case to be made for separating the functions is that both are specialized skills, not
necessarily equally resident in real estate service companies; that leasing remains an
intensely local enterprise while operations competency has become more exportable:
and that the compensation structures for the two activities must of necessity be different.
Advocates of combining the functions cite the coordination benefits of formulating a
strategic plan for the asset with one agent instead of two; and the information synergies
inherent in combining the firm with tenant and market knowledge with the firm most
familiar with the physical asset.
Property management is not perceived as a strategic function: Based on Venkatesan's
second and third tests it would be difficult to claim that property management is a
strategic undertaking. As previously noted, there are many "independent suppliers" of
property management services. While technological innovations are continuously
expanding the realm of capabilities property managers must possess to be competitive,
once they appear they typically are rapidly disseminated throughout the industry. No
examples of firms outperforming their competitors for a sustained period because of a
closely held technological advantage come to mind.
- Providers' cost structures are favorable: Outside property managers may simply give
inferior benefits, contribute less to pension plans, and pay lower salaries than
institutions customarily do. A property management firm looking to expand market
share may offer attractive price concessions, particularly if the foothold gained with the
institutional owner carries with it the possibility of further work with that owner,
expanded scope of services, and market penetration in new geographic areas.
The questionnaire responses revealed an interesting divergence in perception between
the client and provider firms on this question. Client firms tended to rate cost of
services about in the middle of the list of selection criteria for property managers, while
the providers saw it as a key determinant. In follow up interviews, many clients ventured
the opinion that provider fees were so "compressed" by competition that it would be
difficult for any one firm to differentiate itself on the basis of cost.
- Start-up costs for the capability are prohibitive: Developing an in-house property
management capability imposes substantial costs in hiring, training, and equipping the
new staff.
- Opportunities for learning are enhanced by association with a different entity. A kind of
corporate cross-pollination takes place in which best practices are shared.
Conclusive evidence that vertical integration or hiring out property management is the better
course of action is hard to come by. In 1993 Ernst and Young and the International
Association of Corporate Real Estate Executives sponsored a study which sought to
determine if costs were lowered and/or quality enhanced when corporate real estate
departments retained third party providers for their property management functions. Survey
respondents replied that 50% of the time costs were lowered, and 46% of the time quality
improved (Evans). This is hardly a ringing endorsement of outsourcing, and, in any case, it
is not clear that data from corporate real estate is reliably generalizable to institutional
portfolios.
Even if the results had been more conclusive, and corporate real estate was regarded as a fair
proxy for institutional real estate, writers on the topic of outsourcing caution policy makers
to carefully examine the data. They note, for example, that price and performance
improvements that come with hiring outside help may be dependent on the development of
new technologies that would have been equally available to the owner/investor. Often the
efficiencies achieved by outside providers could have been duplicated in-house with proper
motivation and backing from management. Ironically, in-house services can cost more
because they suffer from the perception that they are "free", a perception that could be
mitigated with charge-back and request prioritization systems It also has been suggested
that property management accounts often are accepted at low profit margins so that other
services that generate a substantial profit level, such as leasing, tenant improvement,
construction/supervision, and disposition fees, may be provided. (Ackerberg, 1989)
Most experts on vertical integration and outsourcing seem to feel that the decision of which
course to adopt should be subjected to constant reevaluation. Market forces are dynamic, so
this important choice should not be made once and forgotten. Ackerberg suggests that a
bottom up approach be taken. He says that examination of the special characteristics of the
assets themselves should provide the first clue which way to go. This is the only way to
determine if specialization matters, if economies of scale are present, and so on. Changes in
the portfolio should dictate changes in property management strategy. Property
management policy should not be developed in the corporate board room based on sound
principles alone.
As noted earlier, determining the appropriate organization for the property management
function involves more than just the choice between having an in-house capability or hiring
an outside provider. There is more than one strategy for organizing the service when it is
obtained outside of the organization, and hybrid forms are very likely to exist. Respondents
to the questionnaire described some hybrid property management strategies currently in
use. One advisory firm, with a total of 4 billion under management, used national firms, an
in-house subsidiary, and a partner firm in roughly equal percentages. Most of the
respondents used local firms to some extent, but none used them for more than 20% of their
property management needs. Three of the firms had a small - less than 10% of the total - in
house property management capability, suggesting a response to some special characteristic
of the investment portfolio such as a particular asset type or geographic concentration.
Early in crafting a property management strategy the owner must confront "second order"
considerations, such as whether the leasing and management functions are combined, and
the extent of its concern with potential conflicts of interest. The analytic framework derived
from the discussion of vertical integration is useful in considering these issues as well. The
following table presents what I view to be the principal choices an owner must make, with
rationales for each expressed in terms of the discussion on vertical integration.
Organization of Property Management Effort
Core Strategy Rationale - Anticipated Value Creation
Vertical Integration Creates competitive advantage by maximizing accountability. Reduces expenses by retaining
profits, avoiding bidding costs. May be able to develop superior capabilities in house. Offers
greater administrative efficiency. Permits capitalizing on owner's economies of scale Avoids
risk of conflicts.
Unaffiliated local firms Exploits specialization of providers, particularly local knowledge. Permits maximum
flexibility with respect to business cycles. Promotes shared learning. Avoids costs of
developing own capability. Exposes process to market discipline
National and unaffiliated Suppliers cost structures may be favorable. Exploits specialization of providers. Exploits
regional firms on a regional providers economies of scale. Avoid costs of developing own capability. Promotes sharedbasis learning. Exposes process to market discipline
Networked local firms Same as for unaffiliated local firms, but offers point of coordination, some economies of scale,
access to more specialization
Networked regional firms on a Same as for national and unaffiliated regional firms, but offers point of coordination, some
regional basis economies of scale, access to more specialization
Leasing
Award leasing and operations to Exploits specialization of providers.
separate firms
Combine leasing and operations Offers administrative efficiency. Promotes shared learnin-
Type of Provider Firm
Section 3 - Quality Enhancement - Literature Review
An underlying assumption of this study is that the cost implications of the foregoing
discussion on vertical integration are the one uppermost in the minds of policy makers for
institutional holders of real estate today. In the past few years, dramatic, but "one time" cost
reductions have been realized by many companies through consolidating providers, both
creating and disbanding in-house property management entities, and forming advantageous
alliances with highly capable fee managers. Some of my interviewees speculated that
property management base fees have now been ratcheted down as far as they will go. One
proposition of this study is that interest in property managment techniques which promise
sustainable, if not dramatic, value enhancement is just beginning to emerge. How can
property management performance be improved for the same fees? Can tenant retention
rates be improved? Can the utility of data collected at the property be enhanced? Questions
like this go to the quality, not the cost, of the service being purchased.
The business literature holds that once a company markets its product or service
successfully customer retention becomes a principal focus. Numerous studies have shown
that the costs of attracting new customers, or mollifying disaffected ones, greatly exceed the
costs of keeping existing customers satisfied. Businesses grow and prosper largely as a
result of having loyal customers. Customers remain loyal as long as they are satisfied that
they are getting value for what they are paying. Service business are more likely to deliver
value when they have employees who feel adequately supported by the policies and
resources of the company for which they work. (Heskett, 1994) Maximizing quality is
tantamount to finding a "better way of producing goods and services, a way that eliminates
waste, gives employees pride in their work, and keeps the customers coming back for
more." (Dobyns, 1991) Improving the quality of the process of delivering a good or
service should both improve productivity and reduce costs (Dobyns,1991, George, 1994)
Businesses can improve the quality of their products if they adopt certain policies, attitudes,
and systems - a so called "quality program." The principal components of a quality
program, and their rationales, follow: (Creech, 1994)
Prequalification, Education and Training: A commitment to improving the quality of a
business process requires that a company provide its staff with training, evaluation and
education. At a minimum, employees need to know company goals, policies and
procedures. Staff need to be kept abreast of developments in their various disciplines.
More sophisticated training programs will provide employees with skill in team formation
and management, responding to customers, and structured problem solving techniques.
Screening processes should be used to select new hires, and to assemble project teams.
(Heskett, 1994)
Open, Omnidirectional Communication: Communication is vitally important to service
quality improvement. Information must flow freely if frontline personnel are to be able to
act autonomously. Timely, complete and accurate responses to customers' requests for
information are key to customer retention. Similarly, data from customers and frontline
personnel must flow back to company strategists in an equally timely and complete manner.
Compensation Linked to Performance: Theorists on quality enhancement differ
significantly on one aspect of quality improvement programs. Some feel that a
compensation system that explicitly recognizes improved performance and goals achieved is
necessary. These compensation systems would reward employees not only for individual
improvement, but particularly for their contributions to team and firm-wide performance.
Other theorists, including some pioneers in the quality movement, feel that linking
compensation too closely to specific performance indicators and benchmarks would be
enormously difficult to do and not necessarily value enhancing. They see such
compensation system as constraining, potentially draining a quality improvement system of
much of its flexibility and dynamism. (Heskett, 1994; Lacity,1993; Segal, 1992, Dobyns,
1991)
Full Participation, Teamwork, Frontline Empowerment: Much of the literature about
quality emphasizes the importance of "frontline" personnel. Today, frontline staff must
have not just the ability to "fix what's broke", but also "people" skills, competence with
computer systems, financial and management skills, negotiating prowess, and political
acumen. Most service providers find it essential to have some fundamental grasp of their
customers' businesses. This combination of attributes is necessary to add value to their
customers' endeavors, which is the surest way to obtain and maintain service engagements.
Capable frontline staff can act autonomously, thereby showing themselves, and their
company, to be responsive to customer's needs. As a corollary to the emphasis on frontline
personnel, the theorists state that quality conscious firms should deliver service not through
a rigid hierarchy but via a decentralized structure. They will encourage team formation and
dissolution as specific issues need to be addressed. Staff people will not necessarily have a
"job", but expertise and character traits that are portable within the organization. (Heskett,
1994, Kinlaw, 1992, Brown, 1994)
Measurement, Feedback, Benchmarking: Many aspects of service quality, unlike the
quality of a manufacturing process, are notoriously difficult to measure and compare. The
most easily measured service initiatives, such as efforts to reduce operating expenses, are the
ones that are likely to be fully exploited in the early going. Institutional owners must
measure service intangibles - the customers'impressions of the service provider's reliability,
responsiveness, competence, courtesy, and so on - to monitor all aspects of its provider's
performance, both against its own prior period efforts and against the competition. The
measurement systems themselves are an aspect of a quality enhancement program, in that
they serve both to identify which service areas are most important to customers and to set
performance benchmarks. The design of a truly illuminating measurement system is
challenging task; the best indicators of service quality capture service cost and value
enhancement together (e.g. number of quality inspections vs. cost of planning, travel, and
reporting results). (Lacity, 1993, Kinlaw, 1992)
Continuous Improvement, Long Term Perspective: Service quality improvement requires
several kinds of commitment. It requires strong, visible, yet not prescriptive, commitment to
improvement on the part of company leadership. Leaders should encourage and coach their
firms to improve, without mandating the implementation methods. The commitment should
be long term. While goal setting is an important component of quality improvement
programs, theorists argue that the programs only work when continuous improvement is
stressed, when new and more challenging goals are constantly being identified.
Commitment to improvement should be universally shared. Performance improvement
programs routinely fail when quality conscious people or divisions within an organization
come in contact with colleagues who do not share the mandate. (Dobyns, 1991)
Customer Focus, Market Knowledge: Customer expectations and perceptions determine
customer satisfaction. It is the gap between expectation and perceptions of service that
determines how satisfied (or dissatisfied) a customer is. Expectations are rooted in
standards set by the industry sector, and often by the locality, under consideration. Having
the narrowest gap between expectations and perceptions relative to one's competition in the
sector is a measurement of service excellence. (Easton, 1993; Kinlaw, 1992) Theorists on
customer retention often make the point that an accurate reading of customer satisfaction
levels does not come without probing inquiry. For every squeaky wheel there are many
who suffer in silence. There is a difference between "satisfied" customers, who find service
adequate, and loyal customers who respond to what they perceive as superior service.
(Jones, 1995)
Section 4 - Quality Enhancement Theory and Property Management.
Earlier in this study the concept of the property manager' de facto duty to the property's
tenants was introduced. Even though the property manager is hired by the owner of the
property, and performs certain functions, such as accounting and reporting, strictly on the
owner's behalf, it's day to day dealings are with the tenants. The asset has its champion in
the asset manager, the owner in the portfolio manager. If all three managers vigorously
represent their constituencies there will inevitably be conflict, but the outcome should be
better than if any one of the interests is ignored or subverted. One way to think of the
quality of the property manager's performance is to think of it from the tenant's perspective.
The extent to which tenants needs are being met should be a good gauge of the quality of
the property manager's service. Some theorists believe that in satisfying the tenant/customer
the owner of the property will inevitably be satisfied as well. (Rategan, 1992)
Tenant retention is arguably the property manager's most important job. Tenant
improvement costs for renewing tenants are estimated by one of this study's interviewee's to
run about a third as much as those for new tenants. Satisfied, retained tenants mean lower
marketing costs and the need for fewer inducements such as free rent. In the management
of commercial property for institutions the property manager is on the frontline. The
property manager must have the technical and general business skills mentioned in the
previous section, plus industry specific capabilities such as broad knowledge in such areas
as environmental policy, zoning, access and life safety codes, taxation, utility rate setting, and
the local real estate market. Like any service provider, the property manager must have a
good grasp of each of its tenant/customer's businesses. This is especially true when one
considers that property manager, as the provider of the physical setting for its customers'
work, is positioned to add value on a daily basis and to a degree not enjoyed by the
customers' other suppliers.
The literature has many proposals for initiatives that service providers, and, by extension,
property managers, can take to improve the quality of their service (Ackerberg, 1989,
Rategan 1992). Some common themes weave through these suggestions. Almost all are
directly tied to customer (tenant) perceptions and involve entire management systems, as
distinct from isolated operational improvements (e.g. an improved card access system) that
might be contemplated.
Some of these initiatives, adapted for property management, follow. They are included as
illustrations of measures institutional owners might take, or instruct their property managers
to take, to improve performance. Many are already in use by property management firms
across the country. They can be categorized according to the key components of any
quality program:
Prequalification. Education and Training
Invest in training and education programs to enhance skills in communication,
negotiation, relationship management, as well as keeping staff current in technical
matters. The benefits of technological proficiency need not be limited to the reporting
function. If frontline members of the property manager's staff are properly trained and
enabled to treat the information generated about the asset as real time feedback, they
may be able to adopt mid course corrections in the way they manage the property,
thereby improving results. A beneficial byproduct for firms with training programs is
that staff turnover is often reduced. (Segal, 1992)
- Provide manuals stating institutional owner's expectations for operations, accounting,
and tenant relations. The content of these manuals should be appropriately prescriptive -
highly so where standardization is important, such as in accounting and reporting
requirements, less so where the property manager's good judgment can add value.
Open, Omnidirectional Communication
- Invest in technology. Make it available to frontline personnel. Investigate purchasing
common equipment across a portfolio of properties. Network the properties, regional
and central offices together.
- Enhance communication through all available means including periodic meetings of all
property managers, newsletters, and networks.
- Listen for customers expressing their needs. Is the new tenant with the startup business
more concerned about building image than were any of the existing, long term tenants?
Do the shopping center tenants want measured feedback from their recent promotions?
Compensation Linked to Performance
- Introduce performance based compensation at every staffing level.
- Institute competitions among provider teams for quality based cash prizes.
- Make sure that the quality is not quiet. Tenant recognition of the effort is essential.
Full Participation, Teamwork, Decentralization, Frontline Empowerment
- Include all vendors in a common, integrated compensation plan. Performance standards
should be set with tenant and frontline personnel input. (Segal, 1992)
- Make sure that subcontractor and vendor contracts require performance to the same
quality standards that the property manager has set for itself.
- Introduce performance based fees, with no stipulations about staffing levels or methods,
which would permit the property manager and its outside vendors to control how they
meet the performance standards.
Measurement Feedback, And Benchmarking
- Monitor service performance by distinct categories. This may have the effect of
increasing the likelihood of good quality performance across categories, rather than
permitting the property manager to achieve adequate performance overall by offsetting
weaknesses in unfamiliar tasks with superior performance in areas in which it
specializes.
- Determine correlation between quality measurements at property level and financial
performance of overall portfolio.
e Audit property management compliance with the institutional client's own systems and
performance criteria. Also use tenant satisfaction surveys, which should be designed by
independent companies, not affiliated with the asset and portfolio managers. The two
kinds of survey together should provide a balanced and complete picture of the
manager's performance. Survey questions might elicit tenant perception, related to
expectations, of such things as staff response time, workmen attitude, elevator waiting
time, etc.
- Frequently (perhaps monthly) monitor variances in budgets, rental payment
delinquencies, maintenance, service calls, tenant retention.
- Send owner's representatives to review operations in the field;..
- Give the property managers opportunities to review the asset managers and the
management systems they use. (Spoerri, 1992)
- Benchmark against the competition and local and national standards. Specified baseline
performance standards in the contracts.
Customer Focus, Market Knowledge
- Invest in recruiting and screening procedures for new frontline hires. Hire people who
are "asset attuned", able to collaborate with asset managers in strategic, "big picture"
planning for the property. Stress customer service orientation .
- Hire mangers with, or encourage them to develop, a presence in the market, familiarity
with local agencies, civic institutions, local leaders.
Continuous Improvement, Long Term Perspective
e Continually set new goals, include performance targets in contracts.
- Look for opportunities to broadly disseminate effective policies and procedures across
all three major property management functions.
Section 5 - Property Management - What We Should Look For
I have presented this brief review of the literature on vertical integration and quality
enhancement as a framework with which to analyze the data from the field work conducted
for this study. With this framework we can:
- delineate what kind of arrangement for property management the subject firm has put in
place.
- understand the firn's rationale for its selection.
. illuminate some of the firm's experiences with implementation of the current property
management strategy.
- determine how successful the firm feels its strategy has been to date.
- determine how the firm expects to further refine its strategy.
I sketched a picture at the beginning of this study of what I expected to find when I inquired
into how major institutional owners of real estate approach property management. In the
next chapter I present 3 case studies of property management programs in effect in 1996.
In the section in this chapter on quality enhancement I listed the 7 principal categories of a
service quality program, and gave examples of possible initiatives in each category that a
property manager might pursue to enhance tenant retention. In presenting this material, I
sought to establish a context for determining the emphasis that the owners in the study
placed on enhancing the value of their property management service, and to determine the
extent of their involvement in the actual implementation of the quality enhancements. In
analyzing the cases I will look to see what methods of value enhancement the firms actually
employ.
CHAPTER THREE - The Case Studies
Case Study 1 - TJLI and Cupola Management
The Institutional Owner and the Portfolio
In 1996, the Thomas Jefferson Life Insurance Company (TJL) had 11.2 billion dollars of
commercial real estate equity under management for its general account, in properties
distributed throughout the United States. 75% of the properties were office buildings;
residential, industrial, hotel, and retail properties were represented in the portfolio in single
digit percentages. 60% of the office buildings were in the business districts of large urban
centers, the rest in the suburbs. Among the downtown buildings were many "trophy" high
rise structures.
TJL had been reducing its equity portfolio for some time, and more sales were planned, but
in 1997 it intended to begin acquiring property for the first time in the decade. The size of
the portfolio was to be stabilized at between 10 and 11 billion dollars. TJL also planned to
reduce the portfolio's heavy weighting towards office buildings in the near future.
In 1994 the company had made significant changes in the organization of its real estate
management efforts. Motivated by a desire to improve the operation of its real estate
holdings it created a new centralized property management department called Cupola. Prior
to the creation of Cupola, all real estate management activities had been had been handled by
a single department, Jefferson Real Estate (JRE). After the creation of Cupola, JRE retained
portfolio and asset management functions, while Cupola took over the oversight of property
management. The creation of Cupola as a separate entity from JRE, with a parallel reporting
line to TJL's head of investments, signaled the new importance that senior management
attached to effective property management.
Cupola's mandate was to lower costs at the properties and to deliver "better management."
To oversee the majority of the commercial property, Cupola had nine regional directors,
each assisted by an analyst. The regional directors reported to two managing directors, one
for the eastern and one for the western halves of the country. A centralized support services
group provided resources to all the regional directors. Cupola's department head, and the
Cupola Support Services Group were located in the same city as TJL's corporate
headquarters, along with most of the senior JRE staff.
Together with retaining portfolio and asset management functions, JRE continued to control
lease negotiations and dealt with any litigation involving tenants. JRE provided all the
strategic planning for the assets, making the selling and repositioning decisions. In
addition, it performed property valuations and marketed the buildings. Cupola was
principally responsible for controlling property operating expenses and capital budgeting.
It hired and monitored property managers. Litigation involving the property manager, and
the contractors and vendors that it hired, was Cupola's responsibility. On a per property
basis, Cupola's staffing was leaner than JRE's. One regional director for Cupola, for
example, might have in his or her purview properties overseen by several asset managers.
Setting The Property Management Strategy
Cupola's first major initiative was to undertake a dramatic consolidation of its external
property managers. In its first year it reduced the number from 71 to 22. The remaining
firms were national and regional providers selected on the basis of their perceived relative
strength in each of Cupola's nine regions. In addition to the reputation and track record,
Cupola managers cited operational expertise, range of services provided, and fee structure as
the most important determinants of which property management firms were retained within
the consolidated management structure. Many of Cupola's managers and directors cited
human as well as organizational attributes as being of crucial importance. They were
particularly likely to be favorably impressed by firms staffed with people with both technical
and managerial expertise, with people who could strategize and innovate as well as execute.
By reducing the number of fee managers, Cupola accomplished many things. Recognizing
that the property managers whose services were retained would have larger portfolios from
which they could enjoy economies of scale, Cupola negotiated more favorable management
fees. Beyond this most visible cost cutting benefit, Cupola felt that having fewer providers
would mean that all phases of property management could be standardized and streamlined.
Communications between the properties and regional offices were facilitated. With fewer
sources of information, the aggregation of accounting and reporting data was made quicker
and more reliable. Cupola established consistent tenant relations policies. It found that it
could more readily evaluate performance of its property managers with fewer of them to
monitor.
Cupola elected to continue working with a select group of third party providers, rather than
develop its own in-house capability, partly out of recognition of the difficulty of creating the
function, and partly in an effort to exploit the advantages of the dynamic and competitive
market for fee management services. Staffing its 440 buildings with newly hired personnel
would have been a daunting task. Startup and marketing costs (if third party business was
solicited) of such a venture would have been significant. Furthermore, Cupola saw
advantages to working with outsiders. Rebidding the service annually would keep the fees
disciplined by the market. Information on best practices would flow from outside fee
managers to Cupola, and through them to other fee managers, assuring constant updating of
management techniques and policies. Many Cupola directors felt it would be easier to
demand continuous performance improvements, and if necessary, to terminate the
relationship, with outside providers.
Cupola's decision to keep certain of its property managers and let others go was made
independently of the consideration of who would lease the buildings. When the major part
of the consolidation work was completed, most of the properties were managed and
represented by different entities. Many JRE managers voiced the opinion that leasing was
still an intensely local enterprise, while the other aspects of property management -
operations, reporting, and tenant relations - could be imported. They believed that when it
was necessary to find a tenant, only brokers deeply familiar with local market conditions
and, of most importance, local prospective tenants, would do. By contrast, they felt that
strong property managers could quickly become familiar with local government regulations,
taxing policies, utility pricing, vendors and consultants, etc., as needed. Out of town
property managers could avail themselves of databases of national organizations such as
BOMA and IREM in the search for competent local contractors. At the same time, none of
the managers felt that leasing and property management should be separated as a matter of
policy. That it usually was came as a natural outgrowth of selecting the best firms for the
respective tasks.
Many of Cupola's service providers were full service real estate firms. This meant that they
offered asset and portfolio management services themselves, in some cases on properties in
which they had an ownership interest. In general, Cupola directors were not sufficiently
concerned about the potential conflicts of interest that this posed to be willing to exclude
such providers from consideration. One director noted that the full service firms posed little
threat when they provided property management services in localities where their other
functions were not active. Others said they would be concerned only when the fee manager
was also advising on competing retail properties for pension fund advisors. Their prevailing
attitude was that they should capitalize on the superior performance they felt they could get
from firms that coincidentally provided the other management services, while being vigilant
for any manifestations of conflict.
Building Operations
Although it hired outside fee managers, Cupola remained extremely influential in the way
building operations were actually carried out. In order to support the regional directors
Cupola strategists formed the Support Services Group to improve the coordination and
standardization among properties they wished to achieve. Much of the Support Services
Group's early work, conducted at the direction of the regional directors, dwelt on
formulating standard policies and practices for all aspects of building operations. Support
Services Group staff created national purchasing programs to take advantage of TJL's clout
in the marketplace, as well as to further the standardization effort. The Support Services
Group's other nominal function was to provide additional resources to Cupola's regional
directors in their dealings with the property managers. As property managers proposed
capital improvement programs, or sought approval for hiring a subcontractor, Support
services staff could assess both the proposal and its justification. With the approval of the
regional directors, Support Services Group staff could also, on occasion, be available to the
external property managers for questions and discussion.
In practice, property management for TJL's holdings was a team effort between Cupola and
the fee managers. Cupola issued guidelines, packaged the purchasing opportunities derived
from TJL's economies of scale, and provided advice and consent on capital improvement
proposals (bidding was now required for all but the most minor expenditures on goods and
services). Support from Cupola to building operations came in several forms including
assistance on construction issues, maintenance management programs, environmental
policy, compliance with ADA, equipment purchasing, and sophisticated electrical and
communications systems. Cupola encouraged the property managers, for their part, to
develop their own purchasing advantages, and to deviate from the guidelines when better
solutions presented themselves.
The rationale for Cupola's active role, particularly in purchasing, was persuasive. In its own
words Cupola enjoyed "substantial purchasing power due to volume pricing." One
program, with a national overnight delivery service, shaved nearly 50% off "street" prices.
But there were other, ancillary advantages to a national purchasing program. The list of
goods and services thus purchased constituted a de facto catalogue of pre approved items
from which the property manager could select, shortening the owner's review and acceptance
period. The equipment items on the list were standardized across properties, increasing the
chances that replacement parts for one property might be found in storage nearby at
another. No costly bidding would be required when one of the purchase program items was
used.
Among the list of pre - approved systems were four maintenance management programs.
Cupola had not insisted that only these four be employed, and, as a consequence, many
more were in use in mid 1996. While some Cupola staff bemoaned the failure to
standardize this important maintenance technology, they encouraged the property managers
who utilized any of the available systems to continue doing so because of the very real
benefits they conferred. Even the least sophisticated computerized "tickler" systems
enabled the managers to anticipate and track scheduled maintenance better than antiquated
card systems. Nevertheless, the real promise of this technology lay in the future. Cupola
staff could envision systems which doubled as inventory control and which could be fully
integrated with accounting systems.
Cupola supported property managers in their efforts to craft asset specific value creation
strategies. With recent deregulation in the utility industry, attractive opportunities to
exchange commitments to purchase energy from utilities for certain concessions were often
available at TJL owned properties. These concessions might take the form of financing for,
or outright purchase of, capital equipment by the utility. Cupola and the property managers
jointly pursued other value creation strategies, such as exploiting unused rooftop space for
fee paying communications equipment.
Sometimes property managers would initiate schemes that were of dubious merit, which
highlighted Cupola's mandate to act as watchdog. A director cited an example involving a
property management company overseeing an office park partially owned by another life
company. The manager had devised an elaborate landscaping scheme and proposed it to
Cupola. The landscaping was clearly designed to entice tenants to vacant buildings in the
park owned by the other company. Cupola disallowed the proposal, since the incremental
gain to TJL would have been minimal.
Reporting, Accounting, Data Collection, Communications
Cupola required its property managers to make monthly operating reports. These
documents served a dual purpose. They aided the manager in operating the property on a
day to day basis, and enabled Cupola to monitor the effectiveness of the property manager
in meeting the objectives set out in the budget and the annual business plan. The reports
covered financial and operating activity, including detailed analysis of variances in both the
income and expense accounts.
Most of the reporting was done using Acculedger, a popular accounting software package in
the real estate industry. Acculedger was designed to be easily customized to accord with
firm specific accounting protocols. It permitted data aggregation at many different levels of
detail, and offered completely flexible sorting capabilities. As a result, Cupola and JRE
could obtain very focused information - such as a list of properties at which a particular
tenant was in arrears more than two months - at any time they wanted. To ensure the fastest
possible information transfer, and that the data at any given location was continuously
updated, almost all the properties, regional directors, and the main offices of Cupola were
networked together.
TJL's budget process for its commercial property was lengthy and complicated. Property
managers began producing the annual budgets for each asset at the beginning of the
previous year, in order to allow enough time for thorough review and comment by both
Cupola and JRE. There was a built in step in the process, usually in the middle of the year,
called "re-projection," which allowed the property managers to adjust their initial budgets to
the actual experience of the intervening few months. One of Cupola's early initiatives was to
demand more backup from its property managers on both budget and operating matters.
While Cupola's directors and the financial staff on its Support Services team could not cut
steps from the budget process, they were able, at least, to standardize the new backup
requirements across properties.
During this period Cupola was building a property management database. This was to
capture information about the financial performance of the various properties, but also data
about building operations, tenants' profiles, descriptive information about the properties, and
market data. Cupola's Support Services staff cited a number of applications for the
database, either then in effect or contemplated for the near future. One such application was
an energy management program where data on energy use by property, and oil and gas rates
by locality, could be entered on a monthly basis, permitting energy purchasing strategies
customized by region to be explored. Cupola anticipated that it would be asking its
property managers to supply more and more information from the field as it developed the
database.
Cupola required another key document from its property managers, the monthly Asset
Optimization Report. This report helped both the property manger and Cupola document
their cost saving efforts. The AORs recorded everything from major rebidding of service
contracts to small dollar savings in building supplies purchases. The system permitted TJL
not only to put a specific measurement to the effectiveness of its property management cost
savings effort, but also to see how the benefits were allocated between itself and its tenants.
In this way, Cupola could demonstrate the value created by its efforts to both its
constituencies, the tenants and TJL senior management, with hard numbers.
As it had with building operations, the Cupola Support Services Group supported the
simplification of the property manager's reporting and communication function in various
ways. It arranged for a bulk purchase of personal computers to standardize hardware at the
various sites. It insisted that a standard word processing, spreadsheet and database
application be used at each site. From time to time Cupola's regional directors asked
Support Services staff to audit the property manager's books in the field.
Tenant Relations
In reflecting on the attributes of an ideal property manager, one JRE manager noted the
importance of having a good communicator in the critical role of dealing directly with
tenants. Problems were inevitable, the manager noted, despite the best efforts of highly
trained technicians, and once they happened, the value of a good "explainer" exceeded that
of the good technician. Having realized impressive early gains from the consolidation
effort, Cupola was now embarking on improving its tenant relations and retention programs.
Communication with the tenants was at the heart of these initiatives.
Cupola urged each property manager to adopt a quality improvement program for each
property. One hallmark of the program was a focus on customers, defined in the property
management guidelines as both the tenants and the owner. The guidelines further suggested
that the property mangers "identify the key characteristics of quality expressed by these
customers", and identify "the processes that affect the key characteristics of quality."
Cupola expected the property managers, once they had identified the key processes, to seek
ways to continuously improve them.
Cupola extended considerable latitude to the property managers in their dealings with
tenants. It urged property managers to conduct tenant satisfaction surveys as a means of
"identifying and closing quality gaps." Cupola's property management guidelines
suggested that both face to face and written surveys be used to gauge tenants' views about
the quality of the service they were receiving. The face to face "surveys" could be
performed in the guise of daily check up visits. In that way valuable information about
tenant attitudes could be obtained while at the same time demonstrating attentiveness.
Some of Cupola's preferred property managers already had carefully developed tenant
satisfaction surveys which they used on all their properties, regardless of their client. At
least one of these companies had third party agencies administer the survey, to assure
objective responses. In the summer of 1996 Cupola was busy, with a consultant, developing
its own survey. This survey would supplement the semi-annual visits to property sites to
meet directly with the tenants, usually without the property managers present, that Cupola
already was making.
While Cupola and its property managers were moving aggressively to hear their tenants, it
was not yet clear how the results of the surveys were to be analyzed and acted upon. As
noted, the database was a living, evolving tool. Tenant survey data on such measures as
service request response time were ideal candidates for inclusion in the database, but
formalized incorporation of survey data and the observation of evolving trends would take
more time. In the interim, Cupola had found it difficult to determine appropriate
benchmarks for many of the "characteristics of quality." While national organizations such
as BOMA and IREM could provide some benchmarking data, Cupola staff were not sure
that they were reliable or necessarily applicable to TJL's scale of operations.
Cupola had not linked compensation to tenant satisfaction in any quantifiable way. There
were, for example, no bonus opportunities tied to improvement in tenant satisfaction ratings.
Some of Cupola's property managers maintained their own incentive programs. They
would hold competitions for best customer service among the buildings in their portfolios,
and include as eligible participants vendors and subcontractors as well as their own staff. In
the current market for property management services; however, most Cupola managers felt
that the property managers derived enough incentive to perform well from their desire to
retain the engagement. Similarly, contacts with the fee managers carried no specific
performance hurdles that the managers were obliged to meet or exceed. The mandate for
continuous improvement carried in the Quality Improvement Program was not given a
quantified form.
Results of the Property Management Program
In its first year of operations Cupola was able to claim cost reductions from the previous
year of over 22 million dollars. A good portion of this was attributable to the consolidation
effort. By offering them larger "territories", Cupola was able to negotiate lower
management fees with the remaining property managers. Contract rebidding for services
such as cleaning, aided by the new economies of scale enjoyed by the managers, was
another key contributor to the savings. Cupola ascertained that almost exactly half of these
savings went directly to tenants in the form of reductions in operating expenses for which
they would have been responsible by the terms of the lease. Due in part to the novelty of
the system, performance data on some of its other elements - such as tenant retention - were
not available.
In February of 1996, Cupola held a "Superior Performance in Management" roundtable at
its corporate offices. Many of the preferred property managers attended and spoke
candidly about their reactions to the new property management strategy. Most of the
outside providers cited TJL's lengthy budget process and confusion about lines of reporting
- were they to respond ultimately to Cupola or JRE? - as their principal reservations. On the
whole, however, the managers seemed enthusiastic about the prospect of continuing to work
within, and help develop, the new system.
Most Cupola staff also seemed enthusiastic about the new property management program.
While acknowledging communication difficulties with JRE, and uncertainty between the two
groups about roles and responsibilities, in the early going, they felt that rapid improvement
was being made in these areas. Many felt that they could observe tangible progress in the
qualitative goals of the program - standardization, simplification, increased accountability.
On the negative side of the ledger, some managers cited problems in absorbing and
capitalizing on all of the data being generated. Despite the efforts to standardize and clarify
there were still inconsistencies in industry nomenclature. The exact components of certain
measures, such as absorption rate, were not reliably codified.
More significantly, one Cupola director conceded, the major cost cutting initiatives had
probably been identified and mined of most of their potential. As a practical matter, even
with annual reviews, he did not expect that there would be much turnover in property
management firms in the near future. While subjecting the managers to market discipline
was important to hold down fees, so was tenants' perception of continuity. It was not clear
how comparably large annual savings could be delivered on a regular basis. For these
reasons, the director felt that Cupola might shift its emphasis in the future to revenue
enhancement strategies. The rooftop management program was a manifestation of this
already in effect. The director felt that full implementation of tenant retention measures -
both the policies themselves and the performance measurement systems used to assess them
- could be another fruitful avenue to pursue.
Case Study 2 - FGLI and Pediment Real Estate Advisers
The Institutional Owner and the Portfolio
In 1996, Pediment Real Estate Advisers, Inc. (Pediment), a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Federated Guaranty Life Insurance Company, managed 2 billion dollars of equity real
estate for its parent company. Pediment was formed in 1994 to bring concentrated real
estate expertise to the management of FGLI's real estate investments. Pediment's choice of
an identity distinct from its parent company was a meaningful one. In addition to serving
FGLI, it wanted to develop independent business on its own merits, and to be perceived by
potential clients without preconceptions.
In the summer of 1996 Pediment was attempting to attract capital from pension funds for a
new real estate investment portfolio. The parent company had recently merged with another
insurance company which also had a significant position in investment real estate. Near
term strategy called for divesting the bulk of the second company's portfolio, and for
making new acquisitions. Equity real estate currently represented about 4% of FGLI's
general account. Pediment executives felt that over time that number might rise to 6%. In
the normal course of business, Pediment sold about 10% of its portfolio each year as part of
rebalancing activity.
Pediment managed investments distributed throughout the country with a preponderance in
the southeast. 31% of the properties were hotels, 34% office buildings, most located in the
suburbs, 18% retail, 10% residential and 7% industrial. Senior Pediment executives
characterized the portfolio as of above average quality, and, due to early recognition of the
real estate cycle by the parent company prior to Pediment's creation, accurately valued.
Pediment prided itself on being a decentralized organization. It had an essentially flat
structure, with autonomous acquisition, asset management, legal, engineering and
disposition expertise. All of these capabilities were represented at each of the 4 regional
offices, which were located where Pediment wished to establish market presence. Except in
rare instances, all decision making on individual properties rested with the regional offices.
Necessarily centralized functions such as general administration, investment research and
long range planning took place at a headquarters location.
Pediment leadership had ambitious goals for its performance. It wanted the returns of
FGLI's portfolio to consistently rank in the top quartile of the NCREIF index. The firm's
executives believed that actively managing its portfolio was the key to obtaining these
results. It planned to follow a "rotational" strategy, buying and selling different asset types
and moving in and out of geographic areas as economic conditions dictated. In some
instances it would reposition a property, and sell it when it could fully capture its new worth.
In a more general sense, Pediment executives felt that it had to be, in the words of one
director, "extremely flexible, always ready to react and change course." Pediment wanted to
have the nimbleness of an independent advisory firm. Recently the company had been
successfully competing with such firms by conducting speedier acquisition and due
diligence processes.
Setting The Property Management Strategy
Pediment directors were adamantly opposed to the concept of having an in-house property
management capability. In the past, FGLI had operated a subsidiary property management
company which proved to be costly and inefficient. One director illustrated the in-house
property management company's cost disadvantage by observing that FGLI extended its
defined benefit pension coverage to all its employees, and that it staffed its properties with
full time rather than spot workers. It simply could not compete with companies able to hire
workers with less generous benefits on an as needed basis. The firm's cost inefficiencies
escalated with the larger buildings in FGLI's portfolio. Since closing down the subsidiary
FGLI no long possessed property management capability. Moreover, in the opinion of
Pediment's directors, the advisory company had a fiduciary duty to consistently go to the
market to seek the best property management service at the best price. As one director put
it, "How could you ever prove to your investors that your internal property management
firm is the most cost effective? Could you fire the firm if it wasn't?"
As a result of FGLI loan foreclosures, Pediment inherited a roster of management firms.
Some were national operations, but the majority were local and regional players. Pediment
wanted to consolidate the number of its providers, citing the economies of scale and scope,
and the expected improvements in operational efficiency and reporting accuracy to be
gained. Through consolidation Pediment would become a more important client in the eyes
of the remaining external providers. Not only could it anticipate being able to negotiate
lower fees, but it expected also to receive greater attentiveness and better quality staff.
Pediment felt that some of the inherited fee management firms were simply too small to be
able to work effectively in this new environment. In foreclosures, Pediment replaced former
owner/managers, judging that the risks of dealing with a potentially demoralized entity far
outweighed the possible advantages to be gained from its familiarity with the property and
the tenants in place.
Pediment's regional directors viewed the ideal degree to which the consolidation should
occur differently. The manager of the largest regional portfolio felt that working with only
1 or 2 property management firms by asset type within each of his principal sub regions
(states and clusters of cities) could simplify administrative activities and heighten
performance. By contrast, a second regional manager noted that, contrary to marketing
representations, the quality of individual offices in regional and national property
management firms could be very uneven. Further, he had often encountered active rivalries
between the local offices of large property management companies. His preferred strategy
was to work with a single property manager in each major city where his properties were
concentrated.
According to one Pediment director, eligible candidates for a property management
assignment must be able to work for a competitive fee, have a pre-existing presence in the
region, adequate technological capability, engineering and maintenance expertise, a good
track record, an established quality program, and highly qualified staff and management. A
viable candidate needed a sophisticated, well staffed MIS department in place. Most of the
Pediment directors cited the importance of choosing specialized property managers for
certain asset types in the portfolio, such as flex space, service, and R&D properties. One
noted that for retail properties he found it effective not only to hire retail specialists, but
firms with prior relationships with his principal tenants.
Pediment sought lasting relationships with its providers. Whenever replacements were
required, Pediment looked first at firms with which it was already working. Pediment was
concerned about potential conflict of interest and breaches of confidentiality, and, where it
could, carefully avoided hiring property managers affiliated with competing asset
management firms. It typically hired property management firms to provide "core" services,
preferring to make separate arrangements, when necessary, for specialized work such as
environmental analysis and remediation, master planning, and large capital improvements.
In Pediment's flat, decentralized organization, asset managers had a good deal of autonomy,
and were regarded, and expected to think, much like CEO's of their own small businesses.
In staffing each region with legal, financial, engineering and management expertise,
Pediment believed it had laid the proper groundwork for constructing fluid teams for asset
management. Even though the asset managers were nominally in charge of the buildings,
when issues came up requiring a certain expertise, any member of these teams could take
the leadership role.
After the consolidation, single external property managers often reported to several of
Pediment's asset managers in a particular region. Piedmont's regional directors could
intervene if inconsistent expectations became too great an issue. Pediment's directors
believed that maintaining a clear distinction between the roles of the asset and property
managers was critical. Both had a fiduciary duty to their constituencies. Senior executives
felt that it was important for the property managers to act as the voice of the
tenant/customers. They expected the fee managers to think proactivley about the property,
about tenant retention, about "turnaround" strategies, but insisted on the asset manager's
ultimate authority for capital budgeting, lease approvals, and periodic hold, sell analysis.
Pediment believed that leasing and the operational functions of property management
(tenant relations, building operations, and accounting/reporting) were complementary
activities and should be provided by the same entity. It viewed close teamwork between
leasing and operations personnel as essential, and, if performance should suffer, wanted to
have a common locus of responsibility. One regional director negotiated lower fees of
about 50 basis points when purchasing the combined services. Another Pediment director
observed, however, that more and more property owners were placing building
representation on salary. They sought marketing expertise from their property managers
rather than deal making skill. Due to intense competition, property management fees were
significantly reduced from prior years anyway. He felt that even if there were commission
opportunities to offer property managers, there would be little room to negotiate the fees
down further.
Pediment wanted both to establish long term relationships with its providers and to subject
them to some degree of market discipline. Like most clients of property management
services, it typically signed one year contracts with escape clauses for either party after a
minimal notice period. Pediment did not, however, insist that its providers engage formally
in an automatic competitive rebidding process at the termination of each contract. Instead,
its managers reviewed the terms of the agreement against their own collective market
knowledge to keep fee and performance expectations in line.
Building Operations
Pediment exerted very little formal control over its property managers' handling of day to
day building operations, except in the areas of reporting, accounting, and risk management.
While it required that a specific software package be used for accounting, it did not insist on
governing the property managers' selection of maintenance management software. For
properties in earthquake prone states Pediment performed elaborate seismic modeling
studies and instructed its property managers if remedial work was required. Similarly,
Pediment engineers kept up to date on OSHA and ADA regulations. Asset managers made
"check up" visits to their properties two to four times a year.
Of course, many of Pediment's fee managers provided their own guidelines and training
programs for field work. One provider held monthly seminars and workshops attended by
all the property management sub-disciplines - engineering, financial, managerial. Their
intent was to "cross-fertilize", to share insights across disciplines and across assignments.
This same firm also kept extensive trend data on its buildings in order to improve its
benchmarking capabilities. The guidelines covered such topics as crisis communication,
accounts receivable management, preventive maintenance, the due diligence process,
community relations, and environmental regulations.
Pediment selected fee managers who could critically appraise and improve upon current
staffing structures and procedures at its buildings. Pediment wanted these fresh approaches
to be comprehensive - aspiring property managers had to have capabilities in all aspects of
the property in question. Shortly after being retained to manage a mixed use project, one
manager benchmarked the project against other properties in its portfolio, and quickly
developed a new staffing plan to reduce the number of on site personnel and improve their
productivity. Since the complex was entirely powered with electricity, the manager
negotiated an utility agreement in which the project would receive yearly rebates on its
power bills in return for installing more energy efficient equipment. The new manager
assumed the parking facility management, with its own staff, and consulted with Pediment
on the name and graphic identification package of the project.
Pediment's directors placed high value on the contribution property managers could make
via repositioning strategies, particularly in working with tenants. While such initiatives were
often vital components of increasing the appeal of under-occupied buildings, they were also
important as a means of boosting income from fully leased but "static" properties. In one
instance, an external provider helped turned around a strip center by convincing some
tenants, including the municipal library, to move to other properties it managed, permitting
the center's anchor tenant to expand. Pediment valued this kind of resourceful thinking,
which extended beyond simply servicing the needs of the tenants in place. Once Pediment
launched a repositioning strategy it frequently issued RFPs to its current property manager
and to several other firms soliciting ideas from many sources about such aspects of the plan
as what the components of the work should be, how it should be staged, and what it might
cost.
The mixed use project cited earlier combined office and retail space, a hotel, and parking in
one structure in the center of the city. Most of its components were successful, but the retail
shops and associated food court had fallen out of favor with local consumers. The sluggish
performance of the retail threatened the appeal of the entire property as an investment.
Pediment installed a new property manager based on its demonstrated ability to plot creative
turnaround strategies. The manager responded with a process for renewal that ensured that
several solutions, beyond adjusting the tenant mix to the current trends, were explored.
Pediment and its management team approached their task with open minds, willing to
consider dramatic changes, such as retrofitting the entire space for another use, and to invite
community input. Ultimately, the team picked a solution which relied less on extensive and
costly structural reconfiguration than an imaginative relocation and exchange of tenants,
including non-retail uses such as bank back-office functions and a branch of a college. At
this writing Pediment's asset managers are happy with the results, and feel they have
benefited from their property manager's strategic planning skill.
The fee structures for Pediment's property managers were conventional, but some of its
directors were thinking about new ways of aligning compensation with performance. Pass
through expenses could be significant, particularly in retail properties. In one case, a
regional director considered structuring his fee managers' compensation to create incentives
for them to be more diligent in the identification, justification, and collection of these
expenses. Property managers who were compensated solely on the basis of a percentage of
base rent had no incentive to aggressively pursue these payments. The director believed
that, as a general rule, broadening the compensation base to include pass throughs and most
other non-rent revenues while lowering the percentage of total revenue received in fee by the
property manager would result in increased net income to the owners. In theory, property
managers would accept the lower percentage in return for the opportunity to achieve a net
increase in their compensation by adopting more aggressive collection practices.
Pediment executives had also considered unbundling some of its fee managers' services in
order to set up independent compensation schedules for them. It saw this as a first step
towards making possible a more fine grained system of incentives and performance
measurements than it currently used. In some instances, where Pediment negotiated
property management staff salaries separately from the base management fee, a de facto
version of such a system already existed. Like many owners, Pediment already
compensated property managers who supervised significant capital improvement projects on
top of their base fee.
With respect to building operations, Pediment evaluated its property managers primarily on
their ability to realize expense savings from prior years, their effectiveness in pursuing
collectibles, and, in general, their success in executing the year's strategic plan for the asset.
In addition, Pediment looked for demonstrations that the provider firm's market knowledge
continued to pay dividends in contributing to and executing the strategy for the assets it
managed.
Reporting, Accounting, Data Collection, Communications
In most of its regions Pediment had built its accounting and reporting functions around one
software program. Pediment did not require property management firms to have prior
experience with the program, although most of the firms on the consolidated list already did.
Pediment provided no training of its own, preferring that its property managers learn
directly from the software company's own training team. One Pediment executive
acknowledged that placing high expectations on the data management capabilities of the
property management firms, while providing no centralized support of this function within
its own organization, virtually assured that the property managers it hired would have to be
comparatively large firms.
Pediment fully exploited the software's flexibility in presenting data. It collected
information on a property by property basis, but packaged it for review by the client
according to FGLI's lines of business. Pediment required its property managers to file
monthly accounting reports which detailed income and expenses, and variances from the
annual budget plan. Property managers transmitted accounting data simultaneously to their
asset managers in the regions and to Pediment's central offices by modem. Pediment, in
turn, provided fund performance information, including variances from budget, on a
quarterly basis to Federated Guaranty.
Pediment's property managers regularly produced three kinds of reports, and periodically
updated activities such as capital improvement projects. In addition to accounting data, the
regular reports tracked leasing activity on a quarterly basis, and market data as conditions in
the marketplace evolved. Some Pediment asset managers met face to face on a quarterly
basis with their property managers to go over the accounting data in detail, and "recast"
budget projections afterwards if warranted. The leasing report captured data about rental
activity including which prospects had been shown the property, what kind of space the
prospects were looking for, rent terms discussed, tenant retention, new leases for review
(this was felt to be of too much importance for property managers to control alone) , square
feet available, and sq. ft. shown. Pediment looked to the market report for information on
competing properties in the region and general trends.
Pediment's managers attached great strategic importance to obtaining, packaging, and
controlling information in a "seamless" way. They believed that the attractiveness of real
estate as an investment suffered in comparison with stocks and bonds in part because
information about real estate was so difficult to manage. While some investors had been
successful precisely because information was unevenly distributed and of variable quality,
Pediment felt that investors who could consistently rely on good market and property
information, presented in a standardized yet flexible format, would have a sustained
advantage.
Pediment conceded that its own systems did not yet yield seamless data. A good deal of the
information Pediment wanted its property managers to provide was necessarily returned in
narrative form and could not be suitably presented using the accounting software, which was
essentially a customized spreadsheet application. Accounting, or "backward looking," data,
was captured and analyzed in one software package, and cash flow projections, or "forward
looking" data, in another. Many of Pediment's property managers reported to their own
home offices using systems and formats quite different from Pediment's, which could
threatened the timeliness of their reporting to Pediment. While Pediment managers valued
the fee managers local knowledge and required their market reports, they had also learned to
be skeptical of the accuracy of the information thus obtained. They regularly purchased
market data from outside vendors specializing in this work, and through their in-house
research facility, produced their own annual market reports. Thus, despite having networked
offices, standardized reporting formats, and powerful software, Pediment was still far from
having a completely unified system.
The budget and strategic planning process for Pediment properties typically extended from
August to the end of the year. Property managers routinely contributed to the strategic plan.
Many property managers - usually the vertically integrated ones - also marketed valuation
services and sensitivity analyses, but Pediment preferred to do this critical work itself.
Pediment evaluated its property managers' reporting performance at year end on the basis of
its timeliness, completeness, and accuracy. Pediment managers observed generally that their
property managers were quite accurate in their reporting, but that reports often lacked critical
data and were not always received on time.
Tenant Relations / Tenant Retention
Pediment had well established incentive compensation programs with its hotel properties,
but had only begun to consider them for other asset types. Its hotel operating companies
could as much as double their base fees if they were successful in reaching certain
negotiated targets. Rather than being pegged to annual occupancy rates, the targets reflected
the investment performance of the hotels - annual returns and valuation - in order to capture
the net effect of revenues and expenses. For its other asset types, Pediment contemplated a
bonus tied to tenant retention percentages and, for buildings about to be sold, increases in
net operating income.
Some of the regional directors felt that in typical markets tenant retention rates above 50%
indicated that the property managers were doing an adequate job. They viewed the added
value of formal tenant satisfaction surveys with some skepticism, based on a belief that they
were often not thoughtfully filled out and that most tenants made their feeling known in any
case. Property managers stayed on top of their own tenants' accounts receivable and
rollover statistics, but Pediment didn't feel it was possible to have them benchmark this data
against the results of other property managers in the same market. This information was
too jealously guarded by competing firms. When tenants did leave a property, Pediment's
managers expected its property managers to conduct an informal "exit survey", so that
Pediment would know why they left. Sometimes, to provide property managers with extra
incentive to retain tenants, Pediment would pay them half of a typical leasing commission
when tenants "re-upped."
Pediment relied heavily on its periodic site visits to determine how well property managers
interacted with tenants. One director said that it was a "big red flag" if the property manager
and the tenants seemed to be "distant" during the building walk through. One of its retail
property managers shared Pediment's belief that tenant retention was key to investment
performances, and committed itself to understanding its tenants' businesses, even to the
point of offering "image" and visual merchandising consulting to them. This management
company, which was located nearly 100 miles away from one of its properties, bolstered its
efforts through local third party representation, and conducted its own biannual tenant
satisfaction surveys.
Property Management Results / Initiatives for the Future
In its short existence, Pediment had not quantified the savings proceeding from the
reduction in providers. It assessed a manager's success primarily on the previous years
"financials" and leasing activity, adjusted for market cycles. Pediment did not keep other
"scorecards", and relied heavily on the impressions of individual asset managers to
determine whether the service was adequate or not. There were no concrete plans to
standardize new initiatives connected with compensation and incentives.
One director noted that he considered property management to be a commodity, largely
because the highly competitive environment ensured that innovations developed by one
property management company were quickly copied by others. Companies offered a range
of similar services that were not easily differentiable, except on the basis of price. Despite
the company's policy to keep asset and property management distinct, the director said that
he hoped at least some property management firms would upgrade their staffs in the future
to be able to offer asset managers stronger analytic support and assistance in strategic
planning. He felt that firms that could do this would enjoy a competitive advantage over
their peers.
Case Study 3 - JMLI, Finial Real Estate, & Triangle Management
The Institutional Owner and the Portfolio
Finial Real Estate Advisors was a wholly owned subsidiary of the James Madison Life
Insurance Company (JMLI). In 1996 it managed over 17 billion dollars in real estate
equity. Of that total, approximately 5 billion dollars were for James Madison's general
account, 9 billion for domestic pension funds, and 3 billion for foreign investors. It had
over 1000 properties in its portfolio. By area, approximately 30% of its holdings were in
retail, 42% in offices, 23% in land and industrial, and 6% in hotels. Finial's assets were
located throughout the United States, with slightly higher than average concentrations in the
Northeast and Northwest.
Finial considered itself a generalist in the real estate industry, active in all facets of real estate
advisory. It was a decentralized company, operating 14 full service regional offices, where it
offered investors, among other capabilities, expertise in acquisitions, asset management,
dispositions, research, and financing.
Finial: Setting The Property Management Strategy
In 1988 Finial created a subsidiary firm, Triangle Management, to offer property
management services. The decision to do this grew out of frustration with the quality of
these services typically available on the market, compounded by a desire to retain the fees
and profits being paid to others. Finial also wanted to be assured of receiving priority
service from its property management providers, and to bring a measure of standardization
to its operations.
One regional director for Finial observed that having in house property management
conferred advantages in more situations than had been anticipated when Triangle was
originally formed. During the late eighties and early nineties, when many borrowers from
its parent company were in financial distress, Finial found that it could negotiate favorable
workout terms in part because it had a highly capable property management firm on board.
Finial's borrowers could not argue that, as able property managers, they were essential
partners in the deal, when Finial was convinced it could do the job just as well.
At the same time, Finial was not obliged to use Triangle for all its needs, and selected its
property managers from Triangle and other qualified firms based on an even handed
assessment of all the competitors' strengths and weaknesses. Still, as one asset manager
put it, "Triangle is good for our type of owner." Triangle, like Finial, had a large, broadly
diversified portfolio. In many cases the firms traded personnel back and forth, which had
the effect of enhancing their familiarity with each other's policies, procedures, and
expectations.
When Finial selected Triangle for property management duties it generally did not include
brokerage responsibility beyond renewal listings. Finial wanted to be able to give its clients
exposure to the market which it felt it sometimes could not get from its own subsidiary. In
cases where Finial hired an external provider for a full menu of property management duties
it often did so primarily in order to get this strong local representation.
Asset managers at Finial emphasized the desirability of selecting property managers on the
basis of their suitability for the current asset strategy. They expressed readiness to switch
managers when changing strategies, even if the manager in question had successfully
executed a prior plan. When contemplating a repositioning, Finial looked for managers
with redevelopment and leasing skills, and for familiarity with local politicians and
regulatory agencies. If a particular firm was not strong in the day to day operations of the
property, once repositioned, Finial would not hesitate to replace it. While acknowledging
the virtues of consolidating property management providers across a portfolio of properties,
one Finial asset manager indicated that he would contemplate hiring separate managers for
each property if that achieved the best alignment of management capability with asset
strategy.
Triangle's Organization and Strategy
By 1996 Triangle had evolved into two separate firms, Triangle Retail and Triangle
Management and Leasing. Both were leaders in their respective fields. Triangle Retail was
one of the country's ten largest managers and developers of regional shopping centers.
Triangle Management and Leasing (hereafter "Triangle") was one of the top three property
managers for all other forms of commercial real estate, managing more than 120 million
square feet in the United States and abroad. Because of the extent of its business volume
and geographic coverage - it was active in all regions of the country - Triangle brought its
own economies of scale to its engagements.
Triangle enjoyed considerable autonomy from Finial. From its inception it marketed its
services to potential clients other than its parent company with such success that by 1996
only 30% of its business came from Finial. Triangle managed approximately one half of
the property in Madison Life's general account. Despite its distinct name and operational
independence, Triangle executives recognized that perceived conflicts of interest would
prevent them from selling to Madison Life's competitors, and even to many of Finial's. In
recent years Triangle had begun to successfully develop business with the corporate real
estate departments of some of the country's major manufacturers and service companies.
Triangle tried to co-market its operational and leasing capabilities. It argued that combining
the two facilitated communications and improved strategic planning for the asset. A
particularly critical time with potential for conflicting agendas between separate brokers and
property managers occurred when new tenants were being courted. Triangle felt that it
could make the case that the possible excesses of the commission-driven broker could be
mitigated if that broker had to "answer to" his or her colleagues in operations.
One of Triangle's selling points to potential clients was its "incentivized" compensation
program. Many of its employees received a base salary plus a "variable" which depended
on good performance, such as reducing expenses or boosting occupancy, in their area of
responsibility. High level property management staff received bonuses directly tied to the
investment performance - measured by NOI in some instances - of the asset or portfolio of
assets. Triangle felt that this kind of close alignment of incentives with the interests of the
building owner differentiated it from other property management providers. Finial was, of
course, familiar with these incentive programs, and thought highly enough of them to look
for them in the proposals of external providers seeking engagements.
Triangle executives characterized their firm as decentralized and entrepreneurial. They
believed that value was added at the properties where the customers were. As a matter of
principle, they kept Triangle's headquarters operation lean, dedicated only to articulating the
company philosophy and disseminating expectations for quality and consistency to the
regional offices. Decentralization was also a necessary response to changing economic
conditions; fees slashed by competition would not support multi-layered hierarchies.
Property managers in the field retained all decision making responsibility for their
properties, managed their own accounting, and were not subject to centralized review of
proposed expenditures for capital equipment and services (they would, of course, review
significant items with their counterpart asset managers). Delegation to and empowerment of
frontline personnel were key ingredients of Triangle's management philosophy.
Triangle did have a support services group located at its corporate headquarters. It
researched and developed ways for Triangle to further differentiate itself from other
management companies, and provided marketing support. Triangle staffed this group with
specialists - one or two per discipline - in finance, information services, administration and
real estate law. Many of the initiatives developed by Triangle's central support group relied
heavily on technology and would impact all the operational aspects of property
management. Triangle was looking for ways to make its reporting systems cheaper, better
and faster. It had devised automated methods to track service visits, and had put in place
elaborate measurement systems for gauging customer satisfaction.
Beyond exploiting technology on behalf of operations, Triangle also wanted to improve the
quality of its staff. Like many observers of the real estate industry, Triangle's senior
executives believed that property managers needed to be more "value oriented", able not just
to implement cost savings, but capable of ascertaining whether these cost savings ultimately
yielded value to the tenants and investors. While not claiming to have devised the definitive
profile of the ideal property manager, human resources specialists at Triangle headquarters
had adopted a testing program to generate motivation profiles for job applicants in all the
property management subdisciplines. One Triangle director said that the ideal lead property
manager would possess skills in sales, numbers and engineering. If a composite couldn't
be found, he said that he would value the persuasive skills of the salesperson above the
others. A person with these skills could organize and direct a team where others contributed
the accounting and engineering skills, and deal effectively with asset managers.
Building Operations
Finial, Triangle's parent company, did not insist on standardized operating procedures for
its property managers, and had not created guidelines for them except in areas where there
were potential liability issues. Finial provided its property managers with uniform guidance
on environmental and life safety strategies, but valued local knowledge. Finial expected its
property managers to inform them when state or local law, or simply political exigencies,
required a tailored response.
Some of Finial's asset managers speculated that operating expenses in many of their
properties had been reduced as far as they could go. They saw greater potential for adding
value in improving the product they could offer their user base. To them, this belief only
underscored the importance of retaining property managers with superior knowledge of the
local market. Locally attuned players could make informed assessments of the real worth of
strategies such as adding parking, upgrading lobbies, changing tenant mix, or providing
amenities such as limousine services.
Triangle ran a national purchasing program for standard building equipment, supplies, and
services. It used the negotiated prices to set a bar and encouraged individual property
managers to make better deals if they could. The preferred provider's price carried no
condition of exclusivity. Although Triangle pursued this strategy, at least one Triangle
manager remained unconvinced that national purchasing automatically produced lowest unit
cost opportunities. Since Triangle courted corporate real estate work it had often been
asked to demonstrate how it could outperform existing in-house corporate real estate units.
Determining if Triangle enjoyed purchasing advantages over the in-house unit for similar
lists of equipment and supplies was usually an integral part of making this case. In making
this comparison, the manager often found that the best price did not go to the entity with the
clearest scale advantages
The Performance Measurement System: A core philosophy at Triangle was that
processes could only be effectively managed if they were measured. In three years Triangle
had created and refined an elaborate measurement system to track performance data at its
properties. It aggregated this data and returned it to the field, repackaged to enable the user
to better spot trends and make comparisons. Triangle wished to put as much information as
possible in the hands of its frontline personnel, in as useful a format as possible. The
system designers created a vehicle for delivering data to the field which in volume, accuracy,
and turnaround speed far surpassed what even senior managers had access to just a few
years before.
Selecting Data to Measure: In crafting the system the designers had to determine what
kinds of data would be of most use in the field. They solicited input from the property
managers on this issue, and quickly came to realize that a "supply side" approach to
determining the roster of items to track might be productive. They argued that rather than
simply choosing what to measure based on conventional notions of which operations
merited the most attention, it might also be valuable to see what kind of data they were
already getting, and to what better use it might be put. Property managers all over the
country were submitting monthly management reports, but these varied considerably in the
range of items covered and depth of detail. Triangle decided to take an inclusive approach,
coming up with a "data screen" that incorporated measurement categories from properties
throughout its organization. At this writing the system measured 86 separate items.
Triangle strategists formalized and standardized the data screen and included it in a
procedures manual. The data collected fed four distinct information systems - work order,
accounting, preventive maintenance, and management reports - and illuminated seven
functions which were critical determinants of financial performance: marketing and leasing,
maintenance and engineering, customer service, administration, accounting and reporting,
project management, and human resources. Examples of some of the individual items
measured were security, parking income, elevators, janitorial services, energy use, preventive
maintenance, unscheduled maintenance, quality of the management staff and services,
engineering and administrative staff overtime, leasing percentages, and callbacks. The
performance measurement system recorded data in these categories in fine detail. It
measured elevator performance, for example, according to door action, entrapments, lights
and buttons, noise, speed and response time, leveling and shut downs.
Presentation of the Data: Conceptual work on the data system had only just begun with
the selection of data categories. System designers next had to think about how the data
could be most effectively organized and presented. They needed to confront fundamental
questions of how the data should be aggregated. They decided, for example, that
information from properties of varying sizes could be combined, but that attempting to
merge data from different building types would not be illuminating. Triangle directors were
surprised, yet gratified, to discover that only a handful of the measurements were region
specific. The system's architects felt that presenting the data in spreadsheet form alone
would almost guarantee that it would not be fully exploited. They decided to associate
graphs with the data in order to make the reports easier to use, and hence more likely to be
used, and to make trends over time easier to apprehend.
The system's designers decided to present much of their numeric data in ratio form. This
was a useful way to ensure that data about an item was always placed in context with the
appropriate baseline so that performance could be meaningfully evaluated. The ratios
defined how performance would be assessed across all of Triangle's properties, permitting
benchmarking. To illustrate, marketing and leasing personnel could use two ratios: the
prospect ratio and the renewal ratio. The prospect ratio was square feet needed by prospects
divided by square feet of available space, and the renewal ratio, tenant square feet renewed
divided by the total square feet of expiring leases and early renewals.
Obtaining the Data: In designing its tracking system Triangle had to decide where to
acquire the data. Logic dictated that obtaining data from its own properties would be easier,
and more reliable, than getting it from others. Given the number of properties it managed
and its broad geographic coverage, Triangle could consider its own operations a statistically
valid sample for this purpose. Triangle's benchmarking would thus be self referential, but,
in the opinion of Triangle executives, valuable nonetheless. Like many other property
managers Triangle cited the difficulty of obtaining reliable information from competitors,
although it noted that in certain parts of the country consensus had developed among local
players that sharing information was more beneficial in the long run than hoarding it. In
these locations, often under the auspices of BOMA or IREM chapters, a kind of local
benchmarking did take place.
At each property Triangle designated the receptionist's desk as the principal locus of data
input. As tenants made requests for service, the receptionist would enter them directly into
the data system, and would duly note the arrival and departure of the service personnel. An
add-on module to Triangle's accounting software, along with the use of bar code technology,
allowed property managers to track scheduled and unscheduled maintenance on all pieces of
equipment. With initiatives such as this Triangle sought to make the data recording process
as effortless and accurate as possible. Triangle officials reported that many of the
maintenance workers, now routinely equipped with bar code scanners, were delighted not to
have to write anymore and to be catapulted into the "computer age." As a result, one
Triangle executive suspected that a much lower percentage of service visits were going
unreported.
System Technology: System designers discovered that the relational database in the
integrated package of business applications already used at most of its properties by
Triangle was ideally suited to its purposes. They found that they could "open up" the firm's
accounting software so that accounting and leasing information could be swept into the
master database and the results distributed to any regional office or property overnight.
One Triangle executive asserted that there were little or no incremental hardware or software
costs to setting up the data system. The system was PC based, and in its earliest
incarnations did not even require state of the art microprocessors. As Triangle upgraded it
with new features, faster computers were required, but in many instances Triangle was
pleased to find that the building owners would purchase the new equipment. Many of the
84 items tracked were not applicable to all the properties Triangle managed, and Triangle
made sure that the system in its core form was cost effective even for small properties.
System Applications: Triangle emphasized that it developed the system first and foremost
for its managers in the field. Senior Triangle officials wanted these field staff to have first
crack at the enhanced data in order to learn about their own work processes and to discover
where there was room for improvement. They recognized that the field managers could
worry that the information would be misconstrued by asset managers, and delayed
production of regional comparison graphs until the system had been in effect for a year and
a half, so that reliable national averages could be established.
The system's proponents thought that the system was an ideal vehicle for continuous
improvement. In their view a system of measurement enabled property managers first to
frame a goal, then to mark their progress towards it. They also noted a less lofty motivation:
requiring the property managers to produce the measurements ensured that they would do
the work. Triangle inspection teams visited the properties twice annually to verify that the
managers were using the system of performance indicators properly.
The system made available accurate, highly calibrated information on a wide variety of
programs and processes. Triangle's support center maintained a database of leasing terms
in effect nationwide. This information provided valuable backup to lease negotiators,
particularly when dealing with a potential tenant who was already in a Triangle property in
another part of the country. Through the addition of the work order module to the
accounting software, it was now possible not just to record what maintenance personnel did
in a day, but also exactly what proportion of the day was spent productively and what was
"down" time. The "supply side" approach to data, which captured data that might have
seemed optional to many managers, began to pay dividends. Security system measurements
turned up a distressingly high monthly number of false alarms in Triangle buildings which
lead to investigations unearthing potentially serious problems with the wiring of life safety
systems. A nuisance which might otherwise have been tolerated, when recorded and
observed over time, instead became a red flag, prompting necessary corrective action.
Reporting, Accounting. Data Collection, Communications
As noted, creation of the enhanced database system involved adaptation of Triangle's
existing accounting system. The significant expansion of measurements tracked included
several new accounting items, many of them requested by Finial. The implementation
process for the refined accounting and reporting system followed much the same sequence
as it had for the building operations segment. Use of the system uncovered hidden
problems, then it enabled what Triangle executives termed "defect correction" to occur. For
example, shortly after putting the system into effect, Triangle discovered that the
interpretation of escalation clauses in leases was a wide open affair, with as many as 20
different variants currently in use. It quickly moved to standardize this important
accounting measure, through offering system-wide training to its property managers in the
intricacies of lease contract language.
Triangle managers used their system's capability to produce refined measurements to
improve the timeliness of rent receipts. Triangle had followed the industry norm, checking
for missing payments at 30 and 90 days past due dates. It decided to begin checking earlier,
at 10 days past due. It found dismaying delinquency levels at this earlier date, and began to
issue reminders much sooner to the late paying tenants. In 2 years since instituting this new
measure paid up rates at 10 days increased 40%. As an unexpected bonus, paid up rates at
30 and 90 days also increased. Triangle's cash flow looked better, and it saved on some of
the "compliance assurance" costs it would have otherwise incurred. From this, Triangle
executives concluded that their "early warning" system had imposed a rewarding discipline
on managers and tenants alike at the correct point in the process.
One Triangle director said that the new measurement system was not reinforced with an
incentive program for the property managers, noting that he preferred "friendly competition"
between properties. Although Triangle had the incentives alluded to earlier for certain broad
measures such as improvements in NOI, this particular director was leery of having too
many spot incentives. In his experience he had found many highly regarded property
management staff who had excelled at the measured procedures that carried cash "rewards",
but had neglected everything else. Sometimes incentives were too strong. In one case,
where another company had offered its managers bonuses on a quarterly basis for keeping
"arrearages" down, the policy had engendered such an ambitious response that it created a
tenant relations fiasco. Triangle had managed to get its 10 day late list in better shape
without a cash incentive.
All property managers were required to use Finial's own proprietary software for financial
reporting. The providers also had to be networked to both its regional and headquarters
offices. For its part, Triangle made monthly reports to Finial, including a summary of
operating results, accounts receivable and payable, rent rolls, lease expirations and marketing
activity, budget variances, and subsidiary information such as real estate tax payments and
descriptions of any litigation involving the properties.
Property managers who worked at properties in Madison's general account had to begin
supplying budget data to Finial asset managers in January of the preceding year. They were
thus engaged in budgeting as well as monthly accounting activities simultaneously for much
of the year. Madison's size, the complexity of its investment holdings in vehicles other than
real estate, and its status as a public company made a multi-stage budgeting process
inevitable. This meant that the property manager, as the originator of the pertinent real estate
information, had to get started early and exposed the budget to necessary revisions as the
year wore on. This was particularly true with certain assets, such as hotels, where asset
managers felt that beginning year projections were simply too speculative to be useful for
long.
Tenant Relations / Tenant Retention
Triangle's quality management program established customer focus as the first priority.
Many of the tenets of the program were oriented towards ensuring that the personnel in
constant touch with tenants were up to the task. Property managers who "managed by fact"
using the data provided them could break down a process and assess the value contribution
of each part. As a result, they would give better service. If Triangle provided its employees
with continuous education and assessment, urged them to take responsibility as individuals,
encouraged them to form teams to solve problems, and used its diagnostic skills to put the
right people in the right places, then tenants, and owners, would benefit.
Triangle did run a continuous series of training courses for its employees. Most of the
courses were in building operations - preventive maintenance, energy management, building
systems, environmental and code compliance, etc. - and many, not surprisingly, were in the
use of the performance measurement system itself. Triangle issued periodic tenant
satisfaction surveys in which both its staff and its service were evaluated. Triangle also
submitted itself for evaluation by the owners, its own employees, and third party brokers.
Significant points of evaluation in the owner survey were renewal percentage and
"positioning in the market", the item that many of Finial's managers had highlighted as most
important to them.
Triangle's property management procedures manual contained a standardized tenant
satisfaction survey to be distributed annually. Once again, the building's receptionist served
as the point of entry for the data. One distinctive feature of Triangle's survey process was
that its data measurement system permitted full text comment entries. In keeping with the
"more is more" philosophy of data -nanagement, Triangle did not condense tenant
comments or blur them with an inflexible numbered box format. Triangle officials
performed trend analysis on the comments, just as they did on more easily quantified items,
such as equipment maintenance procedures.
Results of the Property Management Program / Future Plans
Triangle's performance measurement system had been in effect for about three years, but the
firm had not yet formally assessed its contribution to investor value. Triangle executives
were happy with the system as a means of detecting defects in their operations. They felt
that in the three years the system had enabled frontline managers to move from average
performance to above average, and that the system would prove to be a durable analytical
tool, one that would point the way to further operational improvements for several more
years. One of the executives said that he wished in the near future to change the emphasis
from rooting out problems to using the system to substantiate good procedures and
practices, and to disseminate them throughout the organization.
For the most part, the system worked as intended. One manager noted accuracy problems
with some of the data, mostly at secondary and tertiary levels. He and his colleagues had
found flaws in leasing data from time to time, citing incorrect lease expiration dates as one
significant problem. Triangle was considering offering data from elements of the system to
its customers, but recognized the need for better validity checking first. Despite the
occasional glitches, a national consulting firm had recognized the system with its annual
"Best Practices" award for technology implementation.
Triangle's recent involvement with corporate real estate work promised to reinvigorate its
thinking about property management. Corporate management structures and real estate
portfolios were, of course, significantly different from those of institutional investors. In
response, Triangle upgraded its performance measurement system substantially,
consolidating its data entry procedures and, it hoped, improving efficiency. Corporate work,
which often involved complicated sale / leaseback arrangements, demanded new financial
sophistication of Triangle. It expected that developing these new capabilities would only
help it in its core business with institutional investors.
CHAPTER FOUR - Analysis and Conclusions
Introduction
I argued in the first chapter that institutional owners of real estate are first preoccupied with
structuring the organization of their property management function in order to produce
significant near term cost savings. Once these savings are captured, they then turn their
attention to enhancing the value of day to day property management operations.
In this chapter I present my observations about the three cases in terms of the analytic
framework developed in Chapter 2. I will discuss the organizational choices the firms have
made, and the rationales for their choices, in terms of the theory of vertical integration. I will
discuss the efforts the companies are making to enhance the value of their property
managers' services in the context of the theory of service quality.
Choosing the Organizational Strategy: Owners of investment real estate can elect to
vertically integrate their property function or not. If they choose not to vertically integrate
they can hire the service exclusively from local firms or from regional and national firms on
a regional basis. Networks of local and regional providers also exist which purport to offer
their clients some of the advantages of both local expertise and big company scale. Thus,
the five general models for organizing property management are:
- Vertical integration
- Unaffiliated local firms
- National and unaffiliated regional firms on a regional basis
- Networked local firms
- National and networked regional firms on a regional basis.
In Chapter 2 I presented the criteria which, according to business literature, most companies
use to evaluate the decision of whether or not to vertically integrate. They are:
accountability, the strategic nature of the function, supply and demand, familiarity with client
expectations, cost, scale and scope of business activity, specialization, and opportunity for
shared learning. I maintained that if a company chooses not to vertically integrate, these
criteria would also be useful in selecting from among the remaining options. A company
will weight the importance of these criteria differently, and will develop rationales for their
organizational strategy accordingly. On the next page there is a matrix indicating my
analysis of both the organizational choices which the three companies in the cases made,
and which criteria they judged to be significant in making the choice.
Organization of Property Management Strategy
Vertical integration
Unaffiliated local firms
National and unaffiliated regional firms on a regional basis
Networked local firms
National and networked regional firms on a regional basis
Criteria For Choice Cited by Institutional Owner
Accountability
Property management deemed strategic
Supply and demand
Provider supply uncertain
Owner demand uncertain
Familiarity with client expectations
Contract Complexity
Costs
Costs of hiring external provider
Start-up costs for in-house capability
External providers' cost structures
Economies of scale / scope
Specialized skills, knowledge, equipment
Opportunities for shared learning
TJLI
Cupola
JMLI
FGLI Finial
Pediment Triangle
No
Yes
(via JRE)
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Sometimes
No
Yes
Yes
Enhancing the Value of Operations: In the real estate industry tenant retention is the
measure of customer loyalty. The tenants are the principal customers of the owners of
investment real estate. The owners expect property managers to act as their agents in seeing
that tenants are satisfied and want to stay. Because tenants will often have options to move
elsewhere, property managers must in many cases be able to add value to their properties to
keep them. Owners of investment real estate expect their property managers to perform
certain services on their behalf that do not impact tenant retention, mainly accounting and
reporting. The owners will want to obtain more and more value from these services as well.
Theorists on quality hold that value can be enhanced in any enterprise by performing the
work with the following attitudes and systems in place.
- prequalification, education and training
- open, omnidirectional communication
- compensation linked to performance
- full participation, teamwork, decentralization, frontline empowerment
- measurement, feedback, and benchmarking
- customer focus, market knowledge
- continuous improvement, long term perspective
In theory, property managers can set up these systems and imbue their operations with these
attitudes to increase productivity and reduce costs. In this chapter I will analyze the data
from the cases to see if they have done so, and what value they expect to create thereby.
On the next three pages I present matrices, one for each case study firm, which summarize
practices of the firms which are in keeping with these seven attributes of a quality program.
I list these practices in terms of the three main functions of a property manager - building
operations, tenant retention/ tenant relations and accounting/reporting.
Quality Enhancements: TJLI - Cupola
Quality Initiative
Building Operations
Service Aspect
Tenant Retention
Tenant Relations Accounting, Reporting
Prequalification, Education, Training
multi disciplined support,
field guidelines
Open, Omnidirectional Communication
standardize business
software; properties, central
office networked, preferred
maint. mgmt. systems
Compensation Linked to Performance
some PMs organize quality
competitions among
properties
Full Participation, Teamwork, Frontline Empowerment
guidelines not prescriptive;
some PM quality programs
include subs, vendors; PMs
encouraged to have mgmt
skill
Measurement, Feedback, Benchmarking
energy consump measured,
database begun, looking into
merging maint., inventory
control, accounting syst.s
Customer Focus, Market Knowledge
encouraged PM familiarity
with vendors, agencies, rate
structures
Continuous Improvement, Long Term Perspective
sought long term relationship
with provider, held PM
workshops, used national
purchasing as targets to be
exceeded
field guidelines
encouraged PMs to use
tenant satisfaction survey,
t.s.s. addressed in guidelines,
planning own survey
guidelines require PMs
identify customer
expectation of quality
MIS support, field guidelines
standardized accounting
formats, reduced number of
PMs, exploit flexibility fo
software
detailed monthly reporting,
item by item cost savings
reports, allocate savings
separately to tenants, TJLI
Quality Enhancements: FGLI - Pediment
Quality Initiative
Building Operations
Service Aspect
Tenant Retention
Tenant Relations Accounting, Reporting
Prequalification, Education, Training
some engineering, legal
support
some accounting support,
field guidelines
standardized accounting
software; property managers,
central office networked
Compensation Linked to Performance
some bonuses linked to
escalation capture, NOI
improvement. Fee
disaggregation under study
Full Participation, Teamwork, Frontline Empowerment
fluid teams, PMs
encouraged to think
proactively, capitalize on
tenant, market knowledge
Measurement, Feedback, Benchmarking
no central system. Some
PMs hold workshops, keep
trend data, benchmark
sometimes paid partial
"commissions" for tenants
retained
PMs participate in budget,
business plans
accounting, leasing reports
monthly; market reports,
quarterly adjustments to
budget projections
Customer Focus, Market Knowledge
values PMs with local
contacts. conducts extensive
market research
Continuous Improvement, Long Term Perspective
sought long term relationship
with provider, encouraged
PMs to generate
repositioning strategies
PMs held exit interviews,
offered extra services
tailored reporting formats by
clients' lines of business
Open, Omnidirectional Communication
Quality Enhancements: JMLI - Finial - Triangle
Quality Initiative
Building Operations
Prequalification, Education, Training
multi disciplined support,
field guidelines, screening,
training
Open, Omnidirectional Communication
integrated accounting /
performance measurement;
properties, central office
networked
Compensation Linked to Performance
Service Aspect
Tenant Retention
Tenant Relations
multi disciplined support,
field guidelines, screening,
training
Accounting, Reporting
multi disciplined support,
field guidelines, screening,
training
integrated accounting /
performance measurement;
properties, central office
networked
some bonuses linked to NOI
improvement
Full Participation, Teamwork, Frontline Empowerment
PMs autonomous, generate
repositioning strategies.
Perf. Meas. system primarily
for field use
Measurement, Feedback, Benchmarking
perf. meas. system tracks
trends, national
benchmarking, broker
evaluations
Customer Focus, Market Knowledge
performance measurement
system primarily for field
use
perf meas system tracks
trends, national
benchmarking, client
evaluations
PMs autonomous, no
centralized Triangle review
of reports
accounting, leasing, market
reports monthly, refined
accounts receivables policy
values PMs with local
contacts
Continuous Improvement, Long Term Perspective
tenant satisfaction survey
perf. meas. system to spot
trends, set goals over long
term
sought long term relationship
with provider
Section 1 - TJLI and Cupola Management
Choosing the Organizational Strategy: The centerpiece of TJL's property management
organizational strategy was to create an in-house group, Cupola, to select and direct external
property managers in all activities except leasing. It gave this group the double mandate of
lowering costs and improving the performance of property management. Cupola's first
initiative was to dramatically consolidate the roster of property managers already working
for TJLI. It chose regional and national firms almost exclusively for this work. While the
consolidation was in process, and after it was completed, Cupola systematically worked to
enhance the value of property management operations.
In TJLI's organization, JRE managed the leasing component of property management.
Some of its providers were local firms. JRE was willing to forego a degree of simplification
and standardization and the other advantages of "going regional" for the presumed benefits
of local representation. Taken together, Cupola and JRE managed property management for
TJLI using firms from every category of external providers. They thus adopted a hybrid
version of two of the general property management models.
TJLI chose not to vertically integrate for many reasons. It felt it could control the quality of
the services it obtained from outside providers, and was not concerned about conflict of
interest issues. It did not think of property management as a strategic function. It was
concerned about the organizational shake-up required to start a new capability, and uncertain
enough about sustaining owner demand in all the markets where it would have to establish a
presence as a property manager. It wanted to obtain specialized knowledge and capabilities,
and it wanted to be exposed to, and learn from, the experience of other entities. While TJLI
was large enough to enjoy economies of scale by itself, it wanted its external providers to
contribute pricing advantages of their own based on their size and market coverage.
TJLI's organizational strategy had both centralized and decentralized elements (see diagram,
end of this section). The Support Group constituted the centralized function, issuing
guidelines and standards (albeit with input from the regions), and serving as a common
resource to Cupola's regional directors. Questions and issues from the field were directed
to the Support Group and shared among its staff, and could quickly be grouped into the
collective knowledge of the company. By contrast, Cupola located its regional directors
throughout the country. These directors had decision making authority in their regions,
with recourse to the Support Group for advice. External fee managers reported to Cupola
regional directors. Thus, technical expertise was centralized, while authority was
decentralized.
TJLI chose its organization because it felt that leasing and operations were functionally
differentiated enough to warrant two management entities. It believed that leasing was a
local operation and required certain specialized skills. It believed that property management
operations, on the other hand, could be "imported" and that economies of scale,
simplification and standardization were more compelling criteria for the selection of these
providers.
Enhancing the Value of Operations: Cupola networked the property managers
(sometimes the properties themselves) and the regional offices together to enhance
communication. This was important because Cupola's management structure was quite
dispersed, yet its various elements needed to be in contact. Regional directors and the
support services were in separate places. Cupola and JRE both had regional directors, again
in different locations, who would often be managing different entities for the operations and
representation of their properties. It was very important that all these parties keep informed
of each other's activities.
Cupola believed that it could improve the performance of its property managers through
generating data about its properties. Cupola was in the process of identifying general data
and performance measurements it wanted to collect, but had not completed design of a
system for codifying it and determining who would benefit most from it. Cupola was
developing a tenant satisfaction survey of its own to obtain standardized, unbiased view of
what tenants across their portfolio thought of their property management service.
Cupola did not believe in structuring its property management contracts with incentives tied
to performance. It felt such incentives were often counterproductive and that they were not
needed in the present economic climate when property managers would be adequately
motivated simply by their desire to retain the engagement. Cupola did document the value
added (cost saved) of every initiative undertaken by its property managers, and determined
how much should be allocated to the tenant and how much to the owner. This data could be
used to apprise both groups of Cupola's customers how much they benefited from Cupola's
work.
Certain of Cupola's policies enhanced their control over external property managers at the
possible cost of diminishing their flexibility. Property managers could not contract for
materials or services above a certain dollar amount without approval from regional directors.
Cupola provided detailed guidelines for almost all of their property managers' duties, and
the expertise and oversight of its Support Services Group. The guidelines provided what
Cupola though of as a lower bound on service quality, and Cupola did encourage its
property managers to take the initiative to do better.
Case 1 Analysis Summary: Cupola had measured the results in cost savings of its
consolidation policy, and was happy with the results. Although it had decided not to
vertically integrate, it had still formed a fairly elaborate internal management structure
largely to assure the accountability of the property management function. It had embarked
on enhancing the value of its property management operations in the field, but had not
completed all of its planned initiatives. Its internal structure was geared towards monitoring
and controlling property management.
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Section 2 - FGLI and Pediment
Choosing the Organizational Strategy: Pediment's core organizational strategy was to
decentralize its own management functions as much as possible, and to hire external
property managers who were strongest in their markets whether they were local, regional or
national operations. It did not have any dedicated internal property management function.
Instead it established teams in each region charged with all aspects of real estate investment
management, among them selecting and directing property mangers. These teams had little
input from a central source except in accounting matters. Consistent with its determination
to remain nimble, Pediment kept the teams lean and hired consultants and property
managers who could bring innovative thinking about their role to the assignment. (see
diagram, end of this section)
At the time this is written Pediment was undertaking a consolidation of its property
management providers. It intended to created economies of scale, simplify reporting, and
engender greater responsiveness from its providers with the consolidation.
Pediment solicited third party business. Its institutional "parent" created it to manage the
properties in its general accounts, but also made it a profit center, able to work for others
and to develop its own investment products. Conscious attempts were made to give
Pediment an identify distinct from its parent. Its decentralized structure and autonomy
allowed Pediment to get close to its independent customer bases.
Pediment's principal reasons for hiring external providers were that it did not feel it could
provide property management itself in a cost effective manner, and that it wanted the best
specialized skills and knowledge the market could offer. It's investment strategy called for it
to move in and out of markets and it did not want to create and dismantle management
structures accordingly. Its perception of its fiduciary role also contributed to the
determination of its organizational strategy. Pediment believed that it could not vertically
integrate the property management function because it felt obliged to "expose" it to market
discipline periodically, and that this could not be done convincingly with an in house entity.
Pediment believed that it had to keep property management free of conflicts of interest, and
so restricted its list of eligible firms in certain markets.
Enhancing the Value of Operations: Pediment's asset managers worked closely with its
property mangers to ensure good performance, but Pediment had made comparatively few
formal initiatives to improve the quality of their operations. Pediment did smooth
communications by networking its property mangers and both its regional and headquarters
offices, and standardizing accounting software. It had established some compensation
programs linked to performance and was contemplating more. Although it did not maintain
a central database on performance measurements, a number of its providers did,
benchmarking against their own portfolios. To complement its insistence that its property
managers maintain a customer focus, Pediment performed in depth market studies annually,
and with each investment "event." Pediment's decentralized and lean organization
necessarily gave the property managers considerable autonomy.
The lack of a central "clearinghouse" for anything but market and financial data meant that
information on good practices in building operations and tenant relations might not get
circulated throughout Pediment's organization. Information came in various forms from the
field and could not be readily integrated.
Pediment hired property managers who could think proactivley about the assets and could
be responsive to tenants. It particularly looked for demonstrated skill in value enhancing
repositioning programs, and for managers who could make important contributions to
annual budgets and business plans. Still, some directors at Pediment considered good
property management a commodity in adequate supply in the current buyer's market. They
were not inclined to build programs to enhance the value of property management,
particularly when many of the external managers demonstrated that they would do it
themselves.
Case 2 Summary: Pediment was a very new organization. It had begun a consolidation of
property managers for which it had high hopes, but as yet no hard numbers with which to
evaluate the success of its strategy. It did look to property managers to add value in
performing their duties, but left quality initiatives largely up to them. It placed great
emphasis on the competitive advantage of integrated information processing, what it called
"seamless information", but had not yet found the system technology to support this ideal.
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Section 3- JMLI. Finial and Triangle
Choosing the Organizational Strategy: Finial Real estate Advisors had its own property
management subsidiary, Triangle Management. Finial and Triangle had nearly parallel
structures (see diagram, end of this section). Both were essentially decentralized, having
autonomous full service offices in most regions of the country. Both had a headquarters
office which, in Triangle's case, performed a formal processing function for data coming to
and from the properties, as well as developing guidelines, setting hiring practices, and
marketing for the whole company. Triangle's headquarters office stayed out of the direct
report line between the field offices and the asset managers, even when Finial hired external
property managers. Finial and Triangle both solicited third party business.
Finial emphasized integrating the property management function with asset and portfolio
management as a means of ensuring clear communication between parties and consistent
quality. It regarded property management as a strategic function, using Venkatesan's three
tests. Finial and Triangle together clearly believed 1) that property management was
important to both customer groups, owners and tenants 2) that it was a specialized skill, as
witnessed by their training and employee screening programs, and 3) that creative use of
technology could play a significant role. Finial explicitly mentioned the benefits of having a
property manager with an "insider's" perspective on its culture and policies. It did not
believe that the market was adequately supplied with competent property managers. It cited
the significance of recapturing revenues and profits that would otherwise be earned by
external providers. Given these beliefs, Finial's decision to create an in-house capability is
not surprising.
Finial blunted concern about uncertain owner demand by creating Triangle as a profit
center. When Triangle was first established it had regional offices in exactly the same cities
as Finial. By 1996 both entities had evolved their operations enough so that each was
represented in certain cities without the other. By giving Triangle a mandate to develop third
party business, Finial insulated it to some degree from its own business cycles.
Notwithstanding its endorsement of having in-house capability, Finial would not hesitate to
use property mangers other than Triangle, if competing firms had compelling specialties,
particularly local knowledge. In fact, it hired many external providers, making its model of
organizational strategy a hybrid of vertical integration and the use of local firms.
In its fiduciary role as an advisor to its parent company Finial would not hire fee managers
who worked for, or were associated with, its competitors, citing the perceived conflicts of
interest. Triangle did not even bother marketing to Finial's competitors. Finial did not,
however, stress the importance of annual rebidding in the market, though it did claim
willingness to replace managers, even Triangle, for strategic reasons.
Enhancing the Value of Operations: The centerpiece of Triangle's quality enhancement
program was a detailed performance measurement system which was integrated with
accounting data and which permitted users to benchmark with Triangle properties
nationwide.
Triangle produced a multi-volume set of guidelines for its on site staff, produced extensive
diagnostic materials to ensure that the right people were hired for the right task and team
assignments, and conducted numerous function specific training classes. Although the
company stressed empowerment, its training was largely technical and did not appear to
have a process management component.
Most of Triangle's properties were networked - this was essential for the performance
measurement system to work - and it insisted on standardized software for accounting. It
had installed a common computer "language." Its proprietary accounting, reporting, and
performance measurement system was used universally among its buildings.
A necessary prerequisite of a reward for performance program is a good measurement and
trend analysis system. Even though Triangle had such a system it was reluctant, at least
through 1996, to use it for determining bonus payments and compensation levels. It cited
the potential for "punitive" use of the trend data by management. Triangle preferred to use
the system to have underperforming managers attempt corrective action on their own, with
trying to equal the national benchmarks as the incentive.
In its handling of its field staff, Triangle endorsed concept of frontline empowerment. Its
hiring manual described independent, "able to think on their feet", individuals as ideal
property managers. It designed its performance measurement system to put the kind of
information into the hands of the property managers that would enable them to act
independently.
Case 3 Summary: Finial was happy with its decision to maintain an in-house property
management entity. It felt that in the several years of its existence Triangle had
demonstrated that it could bid its services at rates competitive with outside providers. In
creating Triangle, it had accomplished a de facto consolidation of property managers.
Although its quality initiatives were new, Triangle had clear indications of improvements in
various individual processes. It claimed that the performance measurement system had been
inexpensive to implement. Triangle's headquarters office acted on occasion as a passive
conduit, simply packaging information and sending it back to the field to be used however
the managers at the properties wished. In other instances it proposed inititiatives, such as
the revised accounts receivable tracking system mentioned in the case, that eventually
became broad policy.
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Section 4 - Conclusions
Most of the theorists on quality and performance enhancement programs cite as their most
important component adopting continuous improvement as a corporate aspiration. They
feel that the only way to ingrain all the good habits of a quality program is if the expected
gains are not perceived as finite. There is dispute among the theorists about whether setting
any kind of performance improvement goal is wise (Dobyns 181), but all agree that if goals
are set, meeting them is no reason to scrap the program. Instead, the continuously
improving company seeks new goals.
All three firms in the study exist as responses to great changes in the real estate industry. In
some sense, Triangle was created to cushion the blow of the real estate recession, Cupola
and Pediment to deal with its fallout. For much of their existence, Cupola and Pediment
have been preoccupied with consolidating their property managers. Cupola has documented
the success of its effort in fee savings; Pediment is confident that it will have similar results.
Finial, with Triangle long established as its de facto consolidation strategy, did not feel
compelled to further pare down its roster of managers. There appear to be no more
dramatic gains to be had from tinkering with the property management organization chart.
All of the firms expressed satisfaction with their property management strategies at this
level.
All of the firms are now looking beyond their initial organizational restructuring to
determine where property management strategies can continue to enhance value. Cupola
continues to look for cost savings, to effectively control property management through
standardization and oversight. More than the other firms, it is attempting to define its
"architectural knowledge" in order to guarantee the performance of its outside providers.
Pediment 's approach is to run a lean, decentralized operation, emphasize property
management's role in crafting successful repositioning strategies, and create the "seamless"
information system. Finial via Triangle has put in place a performance enhancement
structure which has most of the elements of the classic quality program, stressing
empowerment of frontline personnel. Triangle executives explicitly connected their
performance measurement system with continuous improvement, suggesting that it could be
a vehicle both for finding problems to correct and good practices to disseminate for years to
come.
Executives at the three companies conceded that their systems have shortcomings, internal
contradictions, and unproved aspects. Cupola's organizational structure has created some
confusion in lines of reporting and requires extra diligence to coordinate leasing and
operations functions. It is currently emphasizing oversight and control of property
management activities, but does not want to constrain frontline flexibility and creativity.
Pediment is still attempting to achieve seamless information processing, at the regional level
and between the regional offices of its highly decentralized operation. Pediment clearly
values the strategic contributions the property managers can make in some areas, such as
repositioning, but considers many other property management services as commodities.
The Triangle measurement system is self referential, affording the firm little opportunity to
learn from other organizations. Triangle wanted to explore ways of sharing its performance
measurement system with its customers, yet without distorting its fundamental purpose of
enabling frontline personnel to take control of improving their own work. It was still
experiencing some problems with data validity. All three of the companies say that annual
rebidding of the fee management contracts, or at least checking them in the market place, is a
fiduciary duty, but want at the same time to forge lasting relationships with their providers.
None of the three firms' executives have evaluated their systems on a cost benefit basis. In
Triangle's case the question is whether the costs of setting up the performance measurement
system, which it claims were minimal, have been adequately compensated by tenants
perceiving improved service and opting to renew more readily or being willing to pay higher
rent. In a larger context, has Finial's investment in Triangle yielded adequate returns in the
fees and profits no longer paid to outsiders, and in increased third party business? Cupola's
directors would need to evaluate the improved efficiencies they are generating from their
property managers against the costs of a comparatively elaborate in house management
layer. Pediment's investment in the property management function is very slight, confined
primarily to the reporting function. It might wish to benchmark against other companies to
see if the costs of its network and accounting software, and the time spent in the reporting
function by its property managers and asset managers, are offest by comparably detailed,
versatile and timely data reaching the portfolio managers and their clients.
As a result of this study, the picture I drew of property management for institutional clients
needs some alteration. The actuality of institutional property management appears to be
more complex and varied. Institutional owners have different views about the strategic
nature of property management and organize the function in different ways.
The basic premise that institutional owners are turning their attention to property
management in unprecedented ways appears to be true. However, many do not see property
management as a source of competitive advantage. When a company standardizes a service
or product it turns it into a commodity. Some institutional owners are clearly taking this
approach. They appear to be organizing their property management effort not so much to
be innovative as reliable. The data from the questionnaires and the cases clearly show a
clientele looking for basic operational competence well ahead of strategic capabilities and
quality initiatives. On the other hand, none of the firms questioned put low cost fees at or
near the top of reasons to select a property manager. Property management, from the
viewpoint of the owner, is too important, and not yet standardized enough, to be purchased
on the basis of cost alone.
I stated in my initial argument that local unaffiliated firms would not have much of a role to
play in the future in institution owned real estate. Although many unaffiliated local firms
did lose their engagements in this process, some remained on the rosters of the three firms
because of their unique market knowledge. The clear message was that standardization and
simplification often took a back seat to what a firm could contribute in familiarity with local
prospects, agencies, and procedures.
Another ray of hope for the unaffiliated small and mid-size firm comes, surprisingly, in the
area of technology. All three case study firms cited recent gains in productivity deriving
from new accounting software and networking. Two of the firms, Pediment and Cupola,
cited the high cost of such systems as likely impediments for local firms, unless they were
quite large, to continue to do much work with institutional owners. Pediment and Cupola
were both looking for further advancements in computer systems that would integrate more
kinds of data. Triangle maintained, however, that it had been able to integrate disparate data
systems using existing hardware and software systems and networked desktop computers
without appreciable incremental cost. It may be that technology, seen by some as presenting
an imposing cost hurdle, may in fact enable some local players to get back in the game.
Institutional owners and their advisors have organized to realize significant one time
expense reductions in property management service. The consolidations are evidence of
this. But the follow on premise that the owners will create internal structures to perpetuate
value enhancing change in the property management effort is not so easily substantiated. It
appears that some owners are content to "know what they like" when it comes to property
management, and to leave the business of performance enhancement to the property
management firms themselves. These firms create organizational structures oriented
towards the asset managers, and only tangentially affect what property mangers do. They do
not actively manage property management.
Some owners clearly do regard property management as strategic and a source of
competitive advantage. For them, the study suggests that there is at least one appropriate
structure to explore. It has a number of components. It is vertically integrated at least to the
extent that the "architectural knowledge" - core principles and performance expectations -
can be generated in-house. It has some centralized component for information processing
and dissemination. It has a decentralized aspect to support frontline empowerment and
customer orientation. It has dynamic evaluation systems in place to measure progress.
There is no hard evidence that any of these property management strategies is the right one;
there is no perfect organizational structure for administering property management.
Institutional owners should be prepared to adopt the approach that best suits their overall
corporate business objectives, and which best confronts conditions they face in the
economy.
In another thesis it would be interesting to revisit these firms when Pediment and Cupola are
a few years older to see if Finial just has different business priorities in choosing to
vertically integrate, or if it is evolutionally ahead of the others. None of the firms studied in
depth, and none of the questionnaire respondents, selected the network model for property
management. Research on whether or not this intriguing approach is a viable one for
institutional clients would be valuable. Another fruitful piece of research would be to redo
the thesis at a point in the economic cycle, if it should ever come, when property managers
are the scarce resource. A more robust version of this thesis would expand the range of
firms studied in depth to include a purely vertically integrated company. A good companion
to it would be one structured from the property managers' point of view.
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APPENDIX
Request for Information
from Clients of Property Management Services
(Institutions and Advisory Firms)
Note: In this questionnaire, "portfolio" is defined as the collective sum of the investment
real estate, held for your company and/or third party beneficiaries, that your firm owns or
advises upon.
Please write your name and the name of your company in the space below. This is for the
author's purposes only, to help organize data. No attributions will be made in the published
product.
1. Please describe the investor(s) in your portfolio. Check all that apply.
Insurance Co.
Pension Fund
Shareholders (REIT, mutual fund)
Other (please specify)
2. Please indicate the approximate % of each property type in your portfolio. Note: if
percentages are not readily available, check the property types that apply.
Office CBD __%
Office Suburban ___%
Residential __%
Industrial __%
Hotel __%
Retail __%
Other (please specify) %
3. Please briefly describe the geographic distribution (% / region) of the properties in
your portfolio. Indicate any areas of particular concentration.
4. What is the current market valuation of the portfolio? What % of your entire
investment portfolio (real estate plus everything else) does this represent?
5. What is the approximate size (sf, number of units, etc.) of your portfolio?
6. Please indicate the approximate % of each method of property management that you
employ for this portfolio. If percentages are not readily available, check the methods
that apply.
In house property management %
Subsidiary _%
Outside provider - national firm ___%
Outside provider - regional firm _%
Outside provider - local firm __%
Outside provider - local or regional firm with network affiliation __%
Other (please specify. e.g. various national firms on a region by region basis)
7. Please indicate in order of importance (1 = most important, 2= next most important,
...) the basis on which you select your property management service provider.
Cost of the service
Geographic coverage
Compatible technology
Specialized technology
Operational Expertise (e.g. engineering,
maintenance)
Leasing expertise
Range of services provided
Specialty (e.g. in building type)
Track record
Senior level account manager
Quality program
Other (please specify)
8. Describe the management structure for this portfolio provided by your firm. Check all
that apply
__ Portfolio manager
__ Asset manager
- Property manager
_ Other (please specify)
9. Describe the services provided by the property manager of this portfolio. Check all
that apply.
Building operations / facilities management
Leasing / transactions
Lease administration
_ Real estate project development
Construction and project management
Interior space planning and design
Environmental services
Master planning
Strategic planning and consulting
_ Business support services (e.g. company mail, copier center, shipping/receiving)
Other services (please specify)
10. Please indicate which measures you use to evaluate the performance of your property
managers. Check all that apply.
Tenant retention
_ Tenant mix optimization
Expense cost reduction
_ Enhancement of service quality (reduction in service calls, response time, etc.)
__ Customer satisfaction surveys
- Management fees, costs, and overhead
Accuracy, flexibility, and speed of accounting / reporting
_ Other measures (please specify)
11. Please describe briefly the type and frequency of reports that are routinely required
from your property managers.
12. If you contract for outside property management services, what is the typical length
of engagement?
13. Please list your principal provider(s) of property management services.
Request for Information
from Providers of Property Management Services
to Institutional Clients and Advisors
Note: In this questionnaire, "portfolio" is defined as the collective sum of the investment
real estate held by institutions (such as insurance companies, real estate mutual fund
management companies and pension funds and their advisors) that your firm services. This
questionnaire does not address the other types of clients you may have, such as corporate
real estate divisions.
Please write your name and the name of your company in the space below. This is for the
author's purposes only, to help organize data. No attributions will be made in the published
product.
1. Please describe the investor(s) in the portfolio. Check all that apply.
Insurance Co.
Pension Fund
__ Shareholders (REIT, mutual fund)
_ Other (please specify)
2. Please indicate the approximate % of each property type in the portfolio. Note: if
percentages are not readily available, check the property types that apply.
Office CBD _%
Office Suburban __%
Residential __%
Industrial __%
Hotel __%
Retail %
Other (please specify) %
3. Please briefly describe the geographic distribution (% / region) of the properties in
the portfolio. Indicate any areas of particular concentration.
4. What is the current market valuation of the portfolio?
5. What is the approximate size (sf, number of units, etc.) of the portfolio?
6. Which of the following best describes the type of property manager you consider your
firm to be?
In house property management %
Subsidiary ___%
Outside provider - national firm ___%
Outside provider - regional firm _%
Outside provider - local firm __%
Outside provider - network member ___%
7. Please indicate in order of importance (1 = most important, 2= next most important,
...) the basis on which your services are typically selected.
Cost of the service
Geographic coverage
Compatible technology
Specialized technology
Quality program
Operational Expertise (e.g. engineering,
maintenance)
Leasing expertise
Range of services provided
Specialty (e.g. in building type)
Track record
Senior level account manager
Other (please specify)
